University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2018

Cooperative Subfederalism
Dave Owen
UC Hastings College of the Law, owendave@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 177 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1702

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

First to Printer_Owen (Do Not Delete)

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

Cooperative Subfederalism
Dave Owen*
Cooperative federalism is one of the most important innovations of
American governance. In a cooperative federalism system, the federal
government delegates to states the authority to implement a federallycreated program, and those state implementing actions are subject to
federal administrative oversight and mandatory review. This basic
governance model now pervades federal-state relations and has received
enormous amounts of academic attention.
This Article considers whether analogous arrangements make sense
for state and local governments. Such arrangements do exist, but they
are not nearly as prevalent as their federal-state counterparts, and they
have received little attention from scholars. Yet many of the theoretical
arguments in favor of traditional cooperative federalism extend to
relationships between state and local government. And a review of three
long-established, state-local programs—land use regulation in Oregon
and Florida and air quality regulation in California—demonstrates
that these cooperative subfederalism arrangements can succeed. That
success never comes easily, and it depends upon a highly interactive
governance model. The divided spheres of traditional federalism theory
hold little promise in this realm. Nevertheless, cooperative subfederalism
offers a promising alternative to more traditional ways of structuring
state-local relationships.
Beyond supporting changes in state and local governance, this study
also has implications for traditional federalism doctrine. Most
importantly, it undercuts the tendency, which is particularly pronounced
in Supreme Court decisions, to assume that state government subsumes
the benefits of localism. It also corroborates and extends recent scholarly
work emphasizing federalism as a system of governmental integration,
and it undermines the Court’s and some commentators’ emphasis on
federalism as a system of divided and limited governmental authority.

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I thank Nestor Davidson,
Scott Dodson, Holly Doremus, Felicia Marcus, Zach Price, Dorit Reiss, Reuel Schiller, Jodi Short, Ed
Sullivan, Chad White, and Hannah Wiseman for helpful conversations at early stages of this research
and comments on drafts. I thank the editors at UC Irvine Law Review for their careful work.
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INTRODUCTION
In the middle of the Twentieth Century, after the New Deal had redrawn the
dividing lines of American governance, lawmakers began dabbling with cooperative
federalism.1 Rather than simply divide authority between the federal government
and the states, as traditional federalism theory would suggest,2 cooperative

1. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 723–24 (2006) (describing early
innovations); John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 139, 139–45 (1990).
I use the phrase “cooperative federalism” in this article because these are accepted terms of art,
not because the adjective “cooperative” is consistently accurate.
2. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of [federal and
state] spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”); U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It was the genius of [the
Framers’] idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other.”).
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federalism emphasizes overlap.3 Under the classic cooperative federalism model,
the federal government sets overall program mandates and goals.4 States then have
the option of leading program implementation. If they accept that option, the dayto-day work of administering the program happens largely at the state level.5 But
the federal government retains an oversight role, which typically means that a federal
administrative agency must review, and approve or disapprove, some of the states’
efforts.6 In some programs, if the states fail to fulfill their duties or decline to
assume authority in the first place, the federal agency must implement the program
itself.7
Cooperative federalism has become an integral part of American governance.8
Many of the United States’ governmental programs, in fields ranging from social
service delivery to air quality planning, now use variations on this basic model.9 The
United States is not unique in this trend; around the world, balancing parochial
impulses against needs for centralized coordination has become one of the defining
governance challenges of our era, and some of that balancing has been attempted
through cooperative federalism-like systems.10 Not surprisingly, an enormous body
of literature, both judicial and academic, evaluates cooperative federalism.11
Within that literature, almost all of the attention focuses upon the federal
government and the states.12 Particularly in Supreme Court decisions, local
governments have often been federalism’s forgotten stepchildren.13 Academic

3. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (describing cooperative federalism’s
basic structures).
4. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 665–66 (2001).
5. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
6. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism, and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 671, 672–73 (2016) (describing the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism provisions).
7. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (2014) (describing
federal obligations under the Clean Air Act).
8. See Heather Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 116 (2014)
(“[O]ne of the most important forms of state power now lies inside the federal administrative state.”).
9. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (describing examples); Alaska Dep’t. of Health and Human
Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Medicaid is a
cooperative federal-state program . . . .”); Weiser, supra note 4, at 675-81 (describing cooperative
federalism in telecommunications law).
10. See, e.g., FEDERALISM AND ECONOMIC REFORM: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ( Jessica
S. Wallack & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 2006); ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW (2009).
11. One statistic captures the size of this literature: on January 10, 2018, a search of Westlaw’s
Law Reviews and Journals database for the phrase “cooperative federalism” produced 3,421 hits.
12. Heather Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 7, 21 (2010)
(noting that “[f ]ederalism scholars have typically confined themselves to states” and that “the Supreme
Court itself has often (if unreflectively) treated local institutions as undifferentiated stand-ins for the
state”) (parentheses in original).
13. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487 (1999) (“We do not think of local governments . . . as important components
of the federal constitutional structure.”).
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studies are somewhat more balanced,14 though state-federal relationships still get an
oversized share of attention, and the studies that do integrate local government into
their federalism discussions typically focus on state-local conflict.15 The possibility
of recreating cooperative-federalism-like regimes between states and local
governments—an approach I refer to as cooperative subfederalism—has received
very little academic or judicial attention.16
Yet cooperative subfederalism programs do exist. Particularly (but not only)
in the realms of land use, environmental, and natural resources law, which are the
primary focuses of this article, states often delegate authority to local governments
while mandating state-level administrative oversight and review.17 Sometimes the
delegations are systemic, with entire programs implemented primarily by local
governments.18 Sometimes they are selective, with a few local governments
assuming lead responsibilities while the state government retains implementing
authority throughout the rest of the state.19 Sometimes the programs involve dual
layers of delegations, with the federal government delegating authority to the state,
while still retaining an administrative oversight role, and the state then subdelegating its authority to local levels while again retaining administrative
oversight.20 Other programs do not involve federal participation. In short,
cooperative subfederalism programs come in a variety of models. And while these
programs are not nearly as prevalent as their more famous federal-state cousins,
they do address some important tasks. They could address many more.
The inattention to these programs is somewhat surprising, for many
arguments for traditional cooperative federalism would seem to extend to state-local
relationships.21 Cooperative federalism is, at its best, a principled compromise
between nation- and state-centric modes of governance; it attempts to secure the
benefits of each governing level and of their mutual interactions. According to
conventional wisdom, diffusing power away from the national government
promotes individual liberty, governmental innovation, and political participation,
14. See, e.g., Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional
Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 351 (2012) (summarizing key distinctions).
15. See, e.g., Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018).
16. See Decker, supra note 14, at 356 (“[ T ]heories of cooperative federalism still tend to focus
on the federal-state dyad.”). For the articles that come closest to my subject matter, see Richard
Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’? Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1307–09 (1994); and Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (2017). Briffault describes general parallels between federal-state and statelocal relationships but focuses on traditional federalism rather than cooperative arrangements, and
Weinstein-Tull focuses on programs where the state makes little effort to monitor the exercise of the
delegated authority, in contrast to a cooperative subfederalism program, which uses continued state
administrative oversight to avoid abdication.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See, e.g., infra notes 0–230 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 5–59 and accompanying text (describing air quality planning in Kentucky,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part II.
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and allows government to take advantage of decentralized expertise.22 Conversely,
federal administrative review ensures faithful adherence to national goals, allows
governance to draw upon the greater expertise and economies of scale associated
with federal agencies, and protects against negative spillover effects between
jurisdictions.23 More recent scholarship has reframed these debates, arguing that
cooperative federalism’s greatest benefit is that it requires interaction, and
sometimes productive conflict, among governmental entities responsive to different
electorates.24 One could make—and people sometimes do make—similar
arguments about relationships between state and local governments,25 particularly
in larger states, some of which now have larger populations, economies, and
geographic areas than many nations.26 Particularly for these larger jurisdictions,
cooperative subfederalism might offer a promising option.
This Article therefore evaluates the promise and the perils of cooperative
subfederalism. Part I uses a brief survey of cooperative subfederalism programs to
demonstrate that this governance model is more than just a theoretical possibility.
The survey begins with California, which, in this realm as in many others, has been
a hotspot of governmental innovation. One of the latest initiatives responds to the
state’s high-stakes challenges with groundwater management, and it relies on a
regulatory structure borrowed from one of the classic cooperative federalism
systems of federal law.27 While California’s groundwater experiment provides a
particularly clear example, Part I shows that such cooperative subfederalism
programs are not unique to California. The literature evaluating these programs is
sparse, and it would be a stretch to call them abundant, but they are scattered across
the nation.
Part II explores theoretical reasons why these programs exist and why more
such programs might be desirable. The article focuses on the classic arguments
explaining traditional cooperative federalism, and it explains how those arguments
extend to the relationships between state and local government. The arguments
generally fall into two categories. The first set of claims explains why cooperative
federalism should produce better policy than alternative arrangements. The second
22. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
23. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 613–27
(1997).
24. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1268–69, 1291 (2009).
25. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 1304 (“[M]any of federalism’s values are the same as those
urged by the advocates of local governments when they make their case for the autonomy of local
governments from the states.”).
26. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1957, at 25 (1949) (showing the United States population in 1789); Annual Estimates of the
Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2017,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/state-total.html
[https://perma.cc/7GXT-DC4R] (last updated May 8, 2018).
27. See Craig A. Carnes, Jr., California’s Historic Groundwater Legislation: The Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act, WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chi., Ill.),
Feb. 2015, at 11.
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set explains why cooperative federalism is politically appealing—often for reasons
that have little to do with good policy. Both sets of arguments hold similar
resonance for state-local collaborations.
Part III turns to the potential pitfalls of cooperative subfederalism. Many of
these pitfalls are similar to those encountered by traditional cooperative federalism
regimes, and a growing literature explores the many ways in which federal
delegations can be deeply problematic.28 Some additional pitfalls arise from
distinctive features of local governance, and therefore are accentuated by, if not
unique to, state-local relationships.
Part IV turns from a theoretical account to real-world experience. Drawing
upon a focused review of three cooperative subfederalism programs, it considers
whether cooperative subfederalism offers a promising governance model and how
it can succeed. Two of these programs—one from Florida and the other from
Oregon—involve land use regulation, while the third is California’s practice of
delegating air quality planning authority from state government to local air districts.
For each program, I combined a literature review29 with interviews with state and
local officials, private-sector attorneys, and planners who had been integrally
involved in program implementation.
That review leads to several key conclusions. First, and most importantly,
cooperative subfederalism is a promising alternative to traditional state-local
governance systems. While recent academic literature on state-local relationships
and delegated governance is filled with horror stories, and while no one describes
multi-level governance as easy, participants generally viewed cooperative
subfederalism as a system with strengths outweighing its weaknesses.30 Their
arguments in favor of cooperative subfederalism echo many of the traditional tenets
of federalism theory, and they address many of the classic concerns about local
government.31 Second, however, those strengths depend on a highly interactive and
amply-staffed governance model, often involving flexible boundaries between state
and local responsibilities.32 Some of the judicial proclamations and academic
literature on traditional federalism suggest that legal architects should draw clear
lines and promote hands-off relationships between different levels of government.33
That hands-off approach has little prospect of success with the states and the locals.
And by analogy, a study of cooperative subfederalism suggests that a governance
philosophy premised in division and governmental limitation has limited value for
federal-state interactions as well.

28. See, e.g., Weinstein-Tull, supra note 16.
29. For California’s air quality management program, there was not much literature to review.
Oregon’s and Florida’s land use regulatory programs have produced many studies.
30. See infra Part III.B.1.
31. See infra Part III.B.1.
32. See infra Part III.B.2.
33. See infra notes 268–275 and accompanying text.
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The practice of cooperative subfederalism also holds another important
implication for traditional federalism theories. In many of the classic accounts of
federalism, state and local governments are largely interchangeable, and “[d]eference
to state lawmaking ‘allows local policies “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society . . . .”’”34 No doubt that identification is partly just
carelessness, but it also serves an argumentative function: it allows the partisans of
state-centric federalism to claim the benefits of local governance as part of their
case against federal authority.35 An examination of cooperative subfederalism
reveals the tenuous foundations of that view. The core reason why cooperative
subfederalism is both appealing and challenging is that the states and local
governments are not just different from, but also in frequent tension with, each
other, and these tensions arise partly because states relate to local government in
ways that are similar to federal relationships with states.36 That does not mean that
state governance cannot build on the advantages of local governance; the
assumptions of traditional federalism theory are not entirely wrong. But if states are
to claim credit for those advantages, they should have governance structures that
facilitate successful state-local collaboration. A cooperative subfederalism scheme,
if implemented well, offers a particularly promising option.37
I. EXAMPLES OF COOPERATIVE SUBFEDERALISM: A BRIEF SURVEY
In 2014, amid an epic drought, California enacted the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act.38 The law marked a dramatic shift. For decades,
California legislators had been famously reluctant to adopt regulatory programs for
groundwater use, leaving the choice to regulate—or, more often, not regulate—to
the discretion of local governments.39 But the drought underscored the dangers of
this approach. In normal years, groundwater provides almost half of the state’s
34. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015)
(emphasis added) (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011)).
35. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (asserting that state
power ensures that authority is “held by governments more local and more accountable than a distant
federal bureaucracy”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (warning that we should not
“obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government”) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
36. See infra notes 328–332 and accompanying text.
37. A decentralized state administrative structure also could help realize the benefits of local
governance. See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 116–20 (2016)
(arguing that federal decentralization can realize some of the benefits traditionally associated with state
governance).
38. For information about the statute, its implementation regulations, and other supporting
materials, see SGMA Groundwater Management, CAL. DEP’T WATER RESOURCES, https://water.ca.gov/
Programs/Groundwater-Management/SGMA-Groundwater-Management [https://perma.cc/4J8MFFE9] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).
39. See Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the
California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 39 (2015);
Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 269 (2003).
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water supply, and during droughts, when surface water is particularly scarce, the
state’s groundwater dependence increases.40 For years, California’s aggregate
groundwater use had exceeded natural recharge, which meant the state was steadily
depleting one of its most important resources, much like a family living outside its
means and spending down its financial reserves. The drought brought nationwide
attention to this unsustainable state of affairs, and the resulting sense of urgency
allowed the passage of a major new law.41
While the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act changed the legal
landscape, it did so only partially. State legislators did not completely centralize
groundwater management authority in Sacramento. Instead, they called for the
creation of local “groundwater management agencies,” which will create and
implement “groundwater management plans.”42 Those plans, in theory, will fulfill
the new law’s substantive goals.43 Local government, in other words, will take the
lead. But state administrative agencies will remain involved. The contents of
groundwater management plans will be partially determined by regulations issued
by a state agency,44 and state agencies must review the local plans for legal
adequacy.45 Another state agency will place areas with inadequate plans (or no plans)
on “probation,” and must eventually create its own plans if the local agencies’ plans
remain inadequate or are not created at all.46 The entire system flows from the dual
premises, enshrined by the California Legislature in the new law’s findings, that
“[g]roundwater resources are most effectively managed at the local or regional level”
but that “[i]n those circumstances where a local groundwater management agency
is not managing its groundwater sustainably, the state needs to protect the
resource.”47
This is not the classic model of local governance. As Richard Briffault once
observed, delegations to local government often come with few strings attached:
“[i]n most states, local governments operate in major policy areas without
significant external legislative, administrative, or judicial supervision.”48 Or,
alternatively, states often simply preempt local governance (Figure 1, below,
summarizes these different regimes).49 Governance systems coupling local
40. Leahy, supra note 39, at 14 (“Groundwater provides about 40%-50% of California’s total
agricultural and urban water supply in an average year. . . . During drought, the state can become reliant
on groundwater for 60% or more of the overall water supply.”).
41. See id. at 14.
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 10723 (2017) (requiring the creation of “groundwater sustainability
agencies”); id. §§ 10727–10728.4 (setting criteria for groundwater sustainability plans).
43. Id. §§ 10727–10728.4 (setting criteria for groundwater sustainability plans). For general
discussion of this framework, and the associated challenges, see MICHAEL KIPARSKY ET
AL., DESIGNING EFFECTIVE GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY AGENCIES: CRITERIA FOR
EVALUATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE OPTIONS (2016).
44. WATER § 10733.2 (authorizing regulations).
45. See id. §§ 10733–10733.8 (requiring state-level review of local plans).
46. Id. §§ 10735.2–10736.
47. A.B. 1739, 2014 Assemb., 2014–15 Sess. §§ 6, 9 (Cal. 2014).
48. Briffault, supra note 16, at 1318.
49. See Schragger, supra note 15 (compiling dozens of examples of state preemption).
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implementation with continuous state administrative oversight and review rarely
appear in the state and local government or federalism literatures. But to observers
of federal regulation, this system will sound familiar. Its closest analog is the state
implementation planning requirements established by the Clean Air Act, and similar
programs appear in many fields of federal regulatory governance.50 Similarly, the
intuitions underlying those federal programs—that some problems are best
managed by states, with federal administrative agencies providing oversight and a
backstop—foreshadowed California’s rationales for its state-to-local delegation.51
Figure 1. Comparing Cooperative Subfederalism and Traditional State-Local
Governance Regimes: A Simplified Typology
Traditional
StateDominant
Regime

Traditional
Local
Governance

State
Legislature’s
Roles

Define program
outcomes and
requirements.
Delegate
authority to
administrative
agency.

Delegate
authority to
local
government.
Ad hoc
oversight and
intervention.

State
Administrative
Agency’s Roles

Implement
program.

No legally
defi ned role.

Local
Governments’
Roles

No legally
defi ned role.

Implement
program.

Cooperative
Subfederalism

Define program
outcomes and
requirements.
Delegate oversight and
review authority/
obligations to state
administrative agency.
Delegate
implementation
authority to local
government.
Flesh out program
requirements.
Review and approve or
disapprove local
implementation plans.
Develop
implementation
programs.
Submit implementation
programs for state
agency approval.
Implement program.

50. See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265,
280–81 (2009) (describing the Clean Air Act’s planning requirements).
51. See infra notes 79–116 and accompanying text.
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This Part catalogues such state-local programs and describes different ways in
which they are constructed. While the summary is not complete—the paucity of
literature on these programs makes it nearly impossible to compile a comprehensive
list—it should illustrate the basic points that these programs do exist in modest but
significant numbers and that they often address important tasks.
A. Dual Delegation Programs
Many cooperative subfederalism programs are embedded within traditional
cooperative federalism programs. In these dual delegation programs, the federal
government delegates authority to a state government while requiring a federal
administrative agency to provide review and oversight. The state then delegates
authority to a local government while again retaining continuing administrative
oversight.
This model is particularly prevalent with air quality planning. Section 110 of
the Clean Air Act requires states to develop and implement “state implementation
plans,” which are designed to bring the states’ air into compliance with federal air
quality standards.52 States must submit their plans to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for review and approval, and EPA must
prepare its own “federal implementation plan” if the state does not submit a legally
sufficient plan.53 Other sections of the Clean Air Act create permitting programs
for individual sources and empower governmental enforcement, and states can take
over responsibility for implementing these programs as well.54
In many states, planning, permitting, and enforcement authority remain at the
state level, and air quality management just exemplifies a traditional cooperative
federalism regime.55 But other states subdelegate their authority to local
governments. In some states, like California, the delegations include a broad suite
of Clean Air Act authorities, as well as authority under parallel state statutes.56 In
others—Ohio, for example—planning authority remains with the state while
permitting and enforcement authority is delegated.57 Similarly, some states delegate
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
53. Id. § 7410(c).
54. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183,
1194 (1995) (describing delegated permitting authority).
55. See RBLC Links for State and Local Air Pollution Control Agencies, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/rblc/index.cfm?action=Agency.AgencyLinks [https://perma.cc/
W5VG-ZLRY] (last updated Feb. 14, 2017).
56. See Hall v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 273 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (evaluating a challenge
to a SIP amendment initially prepared by Clark County, Nevada); James D. Fine & Dave Owen,
Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and
Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 946–47 (2005) (describing federal, state, and local roles).
57. See, e.g., About CDAQ, CLEVELAND DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, http://www.clevelandhealth.org/
network/air_quality/about_air_quality.php [https://perma.cc/9DEV-ZNY2] (last visited Sept. 12,
2018) (describing Cleveland’s air quality authority, which includes monitoring, enforcement, and
permitting but not SIP development).
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authority to local jurisdictions throughout the state, while others delegate authority
to just a few cities or counties. California again exemplifies the former approach,58
while Pennsylvania’s delegations to Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties exemplify
the latter.59
Analogous programs also exist under federal water quality laws. Municipal
stormwater permitting, for example, uses a complex federal-state-local regulatory
model. Most states hold delegated authority to implement the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, which is one of the Clean Water Act’s key permitting
programs, and that program extends to municipal discharges of polluted
stormwater.60 States therefore issue storm water permits to municipal governments,
and the permit terms (which are partly dictated by federal law) require those
municipal governments to establish regulatory programs governing the private
entities that send stormwater runoff into municipal systems.61 Indeed, in California,
there are actually three levels of delegation: EPA delegates its permitting authority
to the California State Water Resources Control Board, which delegates that same
authority to regional water quality control boards, which issue permits that require
local governments to regulate private entities.62
Other legal arenas contain additional examples. The Safe Drinking Water Act
establishes monitoring and testing requirements for water supplies, and states often
delegate their responsibilities under the act to local governments.63 Similarly, the
Coastal Zone Management Act delegates authority from the federal government to
states, but states then oversee coastal zone planning done by local governments.64
Outside the environmental realm, food safety law originates partly at the federal
level, but the federal government delegates much of the work of inspecting food
facilities to states, which in turn delegate that authority to local government while
retaining some continuing oversight responsibilities.65 Education law is edging
toward a similar model. While public K-12 education was traditionally the province
of local governments, the Race to the Top program, which required local

58. See infra Part IV.A.3.
59. See also 25 PA. CODE § 127.706 (2018).
60. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012) (defining the scope of NPDES permit coverage for urban
stormwater runoff ).
61. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2011) (describing mandatory elements of municipal stormwater
permits).
62. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1198–99 (9th
Cir. 2013) (describing the system of delegations).
63. See Hannah Wiseman, Dysfunctional Delegation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 259–65 (2008).
64. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Legal Implementation of the Coastal
Zone Management Act: The North Carolina Model, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1, 2.
65. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
VULNERABILITIES IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF STATE FOOD FACILITY INSPECTIONS (2016) (describing
delegations); see also Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2016) (describing roles in food safety inspections).
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governments to implement grants that the federal government issued to states,
injected a dose of cooperative subfederalism into a major new area of law.66
B. Single Delegation Programs
Although some cooperative subfederalism programs are offshoots from
traditional cooperative federalism programs, others do not involve the federal
government. In these programs, the state is only an overseer, not an intermediary,
and the local government is the only delegate.
Some of the most prominent examples of cooperative subfederalism involve
land use planning, a field in which the federal government is nominally absent.67 In
most states, continuing state involvement is also minimal: the state may set general
standards and protocols for local land use planning, and it retains the legal
option of preempting local law, but continuing state administrative oversight and
review—a key element of a cooperative subfederalism program—is not part of the
legal regime.68 A handful of states, however, have tried alternative legal models in
which local land use management plans must receive some level of state review and
approval.69 Oregon and Florida, both of which Part III discusses in depth, are two
of the most prominent examples. Other states have embarked on similar
experiments with using cooperative subfederalism to govern natural resource
management. Massachusetts, for example, delegates wetlands protection authority
to local “conservation commissions,” which implement state law and make
decisions reviewable by a statewide environmental agency.70 Similarly, if less
successfully, Maine has offered local governments the opportunity to assume
delegated authority to implement the state’s Natural Resources Protection Act.71
These examples demonstrate that cooperative subfederalism is important in
some spheres of governance. Nevertheless, the list is limited, and it is particularly
limited with respect to single-delegation programs. Even a brief sampling of
traditional cooperative federalism programs would identify many more programs; it
66.

See LISA DRAGOSET ET AL., USAGE OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES PROMOTED BY RACE
1–2 (2015).
67. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001) (noting “the
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use”). In fact, federal environmental laws,
funding programs, and fiscal policies also play important roles.
68. Edward J. Sullivan & Jessica Yeh, Smart Growth: State Strategies for Managing Sprawl, 45
URB. LAW. 349, 354 (2013) (“Most states do not oversee the land use planning process, instead
delegating planning authority to local governments with few checks or guidelines on processes or
outcomes.”).
69. See generally STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING: IMPLEMENTING NEW
METHODS FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT (Peter A. Buchsbaum & Larry J. Smith eds., 1993)
[hereinafter STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING] (describing several states’ programs).
70. Cymie Payne, Local Regulation of Natural Resources: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Fairness of
Wetlands Permitting in Massachusetts, 28 ENVTL. L. 519, 520–21 (1998).
71. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-F (2018); David M. Zirschky, Rebalancing, Matching,
and Over-Lapping Delegated Authority Under Maine’s Natural Resources Protection Act 2 (2015)
(unpublished student paper) (on file with author) (“[N]o municipality has exercised its option to assume
authority under 480-F.”).
TO THE TOP
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also would include many initiatives in non-environmental spheres like utility
regulation, social service provision, and education.72 That contrast shows that
cooperative subfederalism has not yet taken the world by storm. But cooperative
subfederalism’s somewhat humble present underscores a future possibility:
cooperative subfederalism programs could expand, perhaps substantially. States
hold sweeping authority to define the powers and responsibilities of local
government,73 and there is no legal reason why states could not make cooperative
subfederalism just as prevalent as its federal-state equivalent.74
II. WHY COOPERATIVE SUBFEDERALISM?
Why might a state want to a cooperative subfederalism program? Many of the
arguments will be familiar to anyone who has perused the vast literature on
traditional cooperative federalism.75 According to its proponents, cooperative
federalism offers the best of two worlds: it allows the governance program to draw
upon the distinctive advantages of both the federal government and the states.76
According to its critics, cooperative federalism serves less salutary ends, with
delegation allowing legislators to claim credit for addressing problems while leaving
the hard work to someone else.77 Or, alternatively, it is just a way for the federal
government to steamroll state interests and requisition state administrative
resources while feigning deference and respect.78 As the discussion below explains,
both the policy justifications and the political explanations could apply with similar
force to delegations from state to local governments.
A. Policy Arguments
The traditional arguments favoring cooperative federalism derive from
arguments for federalism more generally. According to traditional federalism theory,
state and local governments offer several major advantages over centralized national
72. See, e.g., F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 779–80 (2016) (noting that
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission implements a cooperative federalism program); T-Mobile
S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S .Ct. 808, 816 (2015) (stating that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
reflects cooperative federalism principles); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (noting that the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act is grounded in cooperative federalism); Wis. Dept. of
Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (noting that Medicaid is a cooperative
federalism program).
73. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal
Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 198 (2005) (“[T]he conventional wisdom is that . . . the state legislatures,
if permitted by their state constitutions, can freely alter or abolish local governments.”).
74. Politics can be another story. The legal explanation of local regulatory authority—that it
derives from state authority—does not always accord with views in the political sphere, where local
governance is often assumed to be a default condition.
75. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 1312–16 (observing that traditional federalism arguments
favor local governance).
76. See infra notes 79–111 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 120–137 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
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governments. Most importantly, because of their greater geographic proximity to
the problems they regulate, state governments are presumed to be more sensitive to
local conditions, accessible for citizen participation, and responsive to local
preferences.79 That sensitivity, in combination with the possibility of different
electoral coalitions forming at state levels, theoretically leads to more nuanced and
diverse policies, which in turn should produce three secondary advantages.80 The
first is states’ ability to function as federalism’s famous “laboratories of democracy,”
the places where new policy ideas can emerge and be put to the test.81 Second, the
diversity of policy approaches theoretically allows and responds to “competition for
a mobile citizenry.”82 Third, and lurking behind all of these justifications, is a more
sweeping theory: diffusing power outside the national government establishes
important checks and balances on governmental authority, precluding tyranny and
protecting individual liberty.83 Indeed, some jurists have gone so far as to suggest
that these features make state and local government, not the national government,
the true heart of our democracy.84
On their own, those arguments would suggest a very limited role for the
federal government, and many participants in federalism debates have deployed
these claims simply to empower the states. But there is a powerful countervailing
set of arguments in favor of continued federal authority. States, as many people
have noted, are often poorly matched to the geographic scale of regulatory
challenges.85 Without a national response to problems like interstate air or water
pollution, the citizens of downstream or downwind states are likely to suffer.86
Similarly, federal governance can offer economies of scale and the benefits of
consolidated expertise.87 Rather than have fifty states each invent their own
response to a recurring regulatory problem, sometimes it is more efficient for the

79. See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (“Because the police
power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that
touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the
governed . . . [and] more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.”).
80. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’
DESIGN (1987)) (“The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local
laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must take a
uniform—and hence less desirable—approach.”).
81. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
82. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (describing “the far more effective role of democratic self-government at the state and
local levels”).
85. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 23, at 587.
86. E.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014) (“Left
unregulated, the emitting or upwind State reaps the benefits of the economic activity causing the
pollution without bearing all the costs.”).
87. See Esty, supra note 23, at 614.
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national government to craft one response.88 Finally, national regulation
corresponds with a widespread sense that shared national interests in some matters
ought to trump more parochial state concerns.89 According to this view, an
individual state should not have unfettered discretion to neglect its citizens’
education or to allow pollution of their air.
Like the arguments in favor of state authority, these arguments could just
support exclusive federal authority, and sometimes proponents offer them to that
end. But to a policymaker who believes that both sets of arguments have some heft,
cooperative federalism offers an appealing compromise.90 It allows each governance
level to bring its relative advantages to the table, while providing protection against
the potential disadvantages of both the federal government and the state. Working
together, federal and state agencies can draw upon local knowledge, for example,
while retaining checks on interstate externalities.91
In recent years, many commentators have questioned the simple dualities
drawn by traditional federalism theory. Some have questioned whether the salutary
descriptions that federalism rhetoric often offers of state government are supported
by empirical evidence.92 Others argue that the states do have important roles, and
that combined federal-state governance has real value, but that conventional theory
misunderstands the nature of that value. Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
Gerken, for example, have argued that cooperative federalism is often a misnomer,
and that much of the value of these systems lies in their ability to provide contained
forums for conflict between the federal government and the states.93 Similarly, I
have argued that subnational offices within the federal government can offer many
of the benefits traditionally attributed to state government.94 Nevertheless, many
critics of traditional federalism theory still support cooperative federalism.95 We
would readily concede that some value arises from joint state-federal governance—

88. Id. (noting that “[i]t makes no sense” to ask individual states or localities to repeat tasks like
determining the health effects of inhaling particulate matter).
89. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199.
90. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 665–66 (noting advantages over dualistic models of federalism).
91. In recent years, many scholars have emphasized the policy benefits that result from such
collaborations. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Jody Freeman & Daniel
A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
92. E.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980).
93. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24.
94. Owen, supra note 37.
95. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 91 (arguing in favor of interactive, overlapping
federalism); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (arguing for overlapping state and federal roles); Heather
K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) (arguing that
federalist systems help preserve national unity); Schapiro, supra note 91.
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and would concede, even more readily, that the idea holds powerful political
appeal.96
These arguments for cooperative federalism could extend to state and local
relationships. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s tendency to treat state and
local governance as interchangeable, many of the traditional premises for criticizing
federal governance—that it is geographically removed, and therefore less sensitive
and accountable—can be and are often lobbed at states.97 Many states are large and
are geographically, economically, and politically diverse. Decisions made from
Austin, Boston, or Sacramento therefore might strike residents of other parts of the
state as no less out-of-touch than decisions from the federal government.98
Participating in decisions made in a state capital also can be just as difficult as
participating in federal decision-making, particularly for people in far-flung parts of
a large state.99 Similarly, if fifty state laboratories of democracy100 sound desirable,
then a system with several thousand local laboratories of democracy might sound
even more appealing, and might also seem to facilitate even more robust
competition for a mobile citizenry.101 In short, if we really believe the traditional
federalism arguments in favor of state government, there is no obvious reason to
stop with states; delegation to local government might seem even more appealing.102
Conversely, continuing state administrative oversight of local governments
might bring many of the same benefits that federal oversight brings to state action.
Perhaps most importantly, state oversight could correct for spillover effects.
California’s groundwater management challenges exemplify this potential. The
96. E.g., Owen, supra note 37, at 113–16 (describing symbiotic relationships between states and
regional federal offices).
97. See, e.g., Paul Feuer, Letter to the Editor, Oppose Preposterous Bills, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2017, http://www.naplesnews.com/story/opinion/readers/2017/03/27/letterseditor-tuesday-march-28-2017/99668186/ [https://perma.cc/Y28Y-399Z] (“Rules involving local
commerce should be made by [local officials], not by bureaucrats in Tallahassee.”); Kevin Miller,
Candidates’ Gloves Come off at Bangor Event, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 2010 (quoting thencandidate, and later governor, Paul LePage as saying, “I believe the county commissioners do a better
job of understanding what is needed in their county than bureaucrats in Augusta”); Dennis Wyatt,
Time to Dismantle Sacramento and Rebuild from the Ground Up, MANTECA/RIPON BULL., May 20,
2009, https://www.mantecabulletin.com/opinion/local-columns/time-to-dismantle-sacramento-andrebuild-from-the-ground-up/.
98. E.g., Miller, supra note 97. Of course, many state administrative agencies have regional
offices, so decisions are often made outside the state capital.
99. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017) (describing local officials
who needed to drive six hours each way to testify before the state legislature).
100. How often the label “laboratory” fairly applies to state and local government is a matter
of some debate. See Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3076066 [https://perma.cc/
DUK8-Y693].
101. See Decker, supra note 14, at 362. The theory of interjurisdictional competition originated
in studies of local government. See Christopher M. Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of
Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 898–903 (2007) (summarizing Tiebout’s hypothesis and
subsequent literature); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
102. See Gerken, supra note 12, at 23–24.

First to Printer_Owen (Do Not Delete)

2018]

COOPERATIVE SUBFEDERALISM

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

193

geographic boundaries of many aquifers extend beyond the jurisdiction of individual
management agencies,103 and groundwater moves in response to pumping,104
creating the threat of a tragedy of the commons, in which individual agencies’
reluctance to regulate pumping depletes neighboring jurisdictions’ supplies.105 The
classic response to such tragedies is to impose collective solutions, but that often
requires intervention from a higher level of government.106 Groundwater
management is hardly unique in this respect. Many local government actions,
including quintessential local duties like policing, providing public education,
making land use decisions, and annexing land, have implications well beyond local
boundaries.107 Individual localities, for example, have strong incentives to use
zoning law to screen out poorer residents. While those actions may protect the local
educational system and property values, they shift financial and environmental
burdens onto neighboring communities (and harm poor people).108 State oversight
can check such parochialism.109
Similarly, state governments can sometimes pool greater levels of expertise
and benefit from economies of scale. Sometimes setting a policy once in the state
capital will be much more efficient than setting it in hundreds of cities and counties
across the state. That may be particularly true if policymaking requires a high degree
of technical specialization. Groundwater management, for example, often requires
complex simulation modeling, and it may be easier for the state than for local
governments to develop that modeling expertise.110 Finally, just as support for
federal governance sometimes reflects perceptions that some issues are inherently
matters of national interest, state governance can reflect the widely shared intuition
that some subjects are too collectively important to be left to unfettered local
discretion.111
Indeed, of all the classic arguments in favor of cooperative federalism, only
one does not translate to state-local relationships. That argument is textual and
historical; it is that, regardless of any functional justification for cooperative
federalism, a balance of federal and state authority is required by the text and
103.
104.
105.

KIPARSKY ET AL., supra note 43, at 21–22 (describing scale mismatches).
See Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 264 (2013).
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249–53 (2000).
106. Id. at 244 (describing this solution and some of the associated challenges).
107. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 935–
49 (2010); Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 219, 237 (describing spillover effects).
108. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781 (1969).
109. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 (requiring affordable housing). But see PAUL
G. LEWIS, CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING ELEMENT LAW: THE ISSUE OF LOCAL NONCOMPLIANCE (2003).
110. See KIPARSKY ET AL., supra note 43, at 23–24.
111. For discussion of this rationale in the context of federal policymaking, see Richard
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1217–18 (1977).
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structure of the United States Constitution, and by the dueling historical traditions
of federal supremacy and state sovereignty that intertwine with that text.112
Cooperative federalism offers a fleshed-out and modern incarnation of
constitutional law’s core compromises113—and, perhaps, a way to work around the
constraints of anti-commandeering doctrine114—while cooperative subfederalism
cannot claim any such pedigree. The United States did not host a constitutional
convention or fight a horrific civil war to determine the relative authorities of state
and local governments. Nor, in many states, can local governments press
constitutional claims analogous to those made by states under the federal
constitution.115 They never enjoyed political sovereignty, and legally, at least, their
authority exists at the discretion of the state.116
But in the constitutional debates of the real world, those distinctions are not
particularly important. Sovereignty and constitutional text appear frequently in the
discourse of federalism, but usually not for long; both jurists and scholars tend to
justify their positions primarily through functional claims.117 And if those functional
claims are the arguments that really matter, then the similarities between federalstate relationships and state-local relationships are much greater than the
differences. Similarly, while the doctrinal differences between federal-state and
state-local relationships might appear profound, the practical realities are not so
different. Federally-untrammeled zones of state authority are more myth than
reality,118 while the political appeal of localism ensures that state authority is far from
unfettered.119
B. Political Explanations
The arguments recited above purport to explain why cooperative federalism
is good policy. It might also be good politics, and that political economy, rather than
functional benefits, may explain why cooperative federalism systems are so
112. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“Various textual provisions of the
Constitution assume the States’ continued existence and active participation in the fundamental
processes of governance.”).
113. See James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 837, 909–13 (2004) (analogizing James Madison’s ideas about states’ roles to modern
cooperative federalism theory). That claim would be contested, of course, by the many commentators
who believe a dual federalism model is more consistent with the Constitution.
114. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (concluding that cooperative
federalism is constitutional while direct orders for state legislation are not).
115. See Barron, supra note 13, at 487 (“[B]lack-letter constitutional law formally deems [local
governments] to be mere administrative appendages of the states that ‘create’ them.”).
116. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
117. See Gerken, supra note 12, at 23 (“Neither originalism nor textualism drives the theory.”).
But see Briffault, supra note 16 (arguing that these historical and legal distinctions should be more
important than functional arguments).
118. See Gerken, supra note 8, at 116 (noting that state authority is primarily expressed within
spheres of federal governance).
119. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001) (discussing
localism’s appeal and influence).
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prevalent. It also can explain why cooperative subfederalism programs are likely to
arise.
Many of the political arguments start with a simple premise: for a legislator
interested primarily in reelection, an appealing response to a thorny problem is a bill
that allows that legislator to claim credit for solutions while deflecting blame for
implementation struggles.120 Cooperative federalism can do this rather well. The
national government can claim credit for addressing some important problem, while
layers of delegation provide plausible deniability, and an abundance of scapegoats,
when implementation goes awry.121 Similarly, if the states do take on
implementation responsibility, then the federal government can claim responsibility
for a solution while only paying for part of the associated administrative costs.122
Closely related is another political benefit: cooperative federalism regimes can
allow legislators to duck thorny policy conflicts.123 Cooperative federalism regimes
can emerge from contexts in which there are strong disagreements about both the
appropriate stringency of a policy response and the degree to which the federal
government or the states should assume primacy.124 Often, also, these issues are
intertwined, with skeptics of the regulatory program hoping for a more lenient
response from the states than the federal government.125 Cooperative federalism
could allow legislators to finesse this problem. They can claim, perhaps somewhat
accurately, to have found a statesmanlike compromise to the conflict between
federal and state authority, while politically savvy regulated entities can keep powder
dry for future administrative policymaking fights.126 Those compromises might
allow legislative sponsors to secure votes for bills that otherwise would not pass.127
That description assumes that a primary goal of cooperative federalism
regimes is to create the appearance of a robust regulatory response while leaving
actual regulation, and the associated political costs, to someone else. But there is
another possibility: legislators supporting cooperative federalism really do want a
robust regulatory program, and the nod to state discretion is the politically expedient
120. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–
58 (explaining similar dynamics in delegations to federal administrative agencies).
121. See Wiseman, supra note 63.
122. See id. at 14.
123. This claim parallels arguments often made in discussions of direct delegations to federal
agencies. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (criticizing Congress for “simply avoiding a choice”).
124. See Kincaid, supra note 1, at 145 (noting that for many people, cooperative federalism leaves
“either a cup half full or a cup half empty”).
125. See, e.g., N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the
1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENVTL. L. 80, 97 (2013) (describing disagreements over the stringency of the Clean Water Act and
the states’ implementation roles).
126. See Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 885,
902 (2006).
127. See Sarah Buckley, Clean Air Post-Healthcare: The Federalism Limits of the Spending Power
and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 101 VA. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (2015) (describing these
dynamics in the context of air quality regulation).
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sham.128 According to this critique, cooperative federalism is often a fig leaf to cover
over federal coercion and dragooning of the states.129 Conversely, a very different
political game is also possible. Political expediency can sometimes advance rather
than retard program implementation, for one benefit of cooperative federalism
programs, from a state regulator’s perspective, is the opportunity to impose controls
that those state regulators support while simultaneously blaming the federal
government.130 Either of these dynamics might help explain these programs’
political appeal.
That appeal also could extend to state and local relationships. California’s
groundwater legislation again provides an instructive example. Achieving
sustainable groundwater management in California will require compelling or
convincing many water users to use less water.131 But getting people to give up
shares of a resource to which they feel entitled, and over which they can assert legal
claims of right, is one of the most difficult challenges government can take on.132
By delegating authority to local governments to address that problem, while
defining overall goals in fairly general terms, state legislators could claim credit for
responding to an important problem while also maintaining some political cover.133
Other scholars’ research documents similar dynamics. Justin Weinstein-Tull,
for example, has chronicled many ways in which states delegate unwanted tasks to
local governments, knowing full well that the local governments lack the resources
to fulfill their mandates, and then disclaim legal or political responsibility for the
ensuing messes.134 Similarly, Hannah Wiseman has documented situations in which
dysfunctional delegations create accountability voids.135 The classic example of this
type of debacle, as Wiseman observes, is the lead contamination fiasco in Flint,
Michigan.136 There, federal law delegated authority to the state, which sub-delegated
that authority to local government (which then, to complicate the story, saw its
operations taken over again by an agency of the state), and only when the crisis
128. See Kincaid, supra note 1, at 145 (“[C]ooperative federalism also served, for many
reformers, as a rhetorical device to allay public fears of centralization.”); Mario Loyola, The Dangers of
‘Cooperative’ Federal-State Programs, NAT’L REV., Dec. 20, 2012, https://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/dangers-cooperative-federal-state-programs-mario-loyola/ [https://perma.cc/3G9C-799Q].
129. See Kincaid, supra note 1, at 149 (discussing Ronald Reagan’s view of cooperative
federalism as “a cartellike venture by liberal federal, state, and local policy activists to expand the public
sector”).
130. See Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1505, 1522–23
(quoting former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus’s description of this “gorilla in the closet”
role).
131. TARA MORAN & DAN WENDELL, THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 2014: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 20 (2015).
132. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 105, at 252–53.
133. The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act contains several appealing generalities that
seem to serve just this end. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(x), (y) (defining sustainability—a key
substantive goal—as the avoidance of “undesirable results,” and defining “undesirable results” in
language that leaves ample room for discretion).
134. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 16.
135. Wiseman, supra note 63.
136. Id. at 259–65.
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became headline news did all levels of government begin to respond.137 Until that
moment, delegating and deflecting responsibility had seemed rather expedient.
The political appeal of delegation thus has two important implications. One,
as the Flint example suggests, is that the practice of cooperative federalism or
cooperative subfederalism could be much messier than prevailing federalism theory
might suggest. The other implication is that the flaws of delegated governance are
intertwined with—and, sometimes, part of—its political appeal. Multi-level
governance may be tempting, particularly for government programs that are
controversial or costly, precisely because it provides the appearance, but not the
reality, of effective and collaborative action. That will not necessarily be the case,
and a cooperative subfederalism system offers the promise of more state oversight
and more intergovernmental checks than a Flint-style system of delegation without
meaningful follow-up. Nevertheless, the threat of governance gaps is quite real.
III. THE DISTINCTIVE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATIVE SUBFEDERALISM
The primary point of the preceding Part is that much of the appeal and many
of the challenges associated with cooperative federalism should extend to
cooperative subfederalism. But there are divergences as well. This Part explores
those differences. Most arise from the introduction of local actors into the
governance arrangement, for the distinctive nature of local governance accentuates
some challenges associated with federal-state delegations and creates others. Other
challenges arise from casting a familiar actor—the state—in a new role.
That discussion comes with two major caveats. First, local governance in the
United States is diverse, and none of the generalizations made here will apply equally
across the entire local government realm.138 The issues faced by a small rural county
or special district are likely to be profoundly different from those confronted by
major cities. My more modest claim is that these issues will often arise. Second, the
comparative baseline matters. The discussion that follows focuses primarily on a
contrast between cooperative subfederalism and pure state authority. But in the real
world, often the choice is between cooperative federalism and largely unfettered
local authority—or no regulation at all.139 In that second circumstance, a
cooperative subfederalism program can ameliorate rather than accentuate the
challenges described below.

137. See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2016) (describing
governance failures).
138. See Nestor Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 587 (2017) (noting
“the vast number of local governments—nearly 90,000 such entities, depending on the method of
counting” and “the variety of local agencies”).
139. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017) (noting that “the state had
to recoup some of its delegated authority from local governments . . . in a state that had been a strong
home rule state”); supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing California groundwater management
prior to SGMA).
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A. Local Fragmentation
One classic argument against federal delegation to states—that it will lead to
fragmented decision-making—applies with even greater force to local government
decision-making. The reason may seem obvious but is important. In all but the
smallest states, there are many more local government units than there are states
within the United States.140 Those local government units also come in greater
varieties than states. Cities and counties can be dramatically different from each
other; the differences, for example, between New York City and a tiny rural town
are more dramatic than the differences between even California and Alaska or
Rhode Island. Beyond counties, cities, and towns, local governance also includes a
variety of special purpose districts, many with geographic boundaries that do not
align with those of general-purpose governmental units.141 Consequently, delegating
authority to local governments means delegating authority into particularly complex
and fragmented institutional terrains.142 And while the state, by retaining oversight
authority, may provide checks on cross-border effects and work to ensure
interjurisdictional coordination, doing so requires coordinating with many more
entities than a federal agency working with just fifty states.
There are potential fixes for this problem. One is to create new local
governmental entities with larger territories. In many states, for example, air quality
management districts govern territories that integrate many individual cities or
towns.143 An alternative approach is to create coordinating bodies that work across
the boundaries of individual governance units.144 Indeed, that latter option is a core
element of a cooperative subfederalism regime, which envisions the state as the
coordinating entity. But either of these fixes takes work and requires adding
additional institutions and layers of bureaucracy to an already complex mix.
Sometimes either retaining centralized state authority or leaving everything to the
locals will be easier.145
B. Local Capacity
A second set of challenges arises from the distinctive ways in which local
governments are staffed. In many jurisdictions, local government depends heavily
140. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 45
(4th ed. 2013) (noting that the 2010 census counted 39,044 general purpose governments and 50,532
special districts in the United States).
141. See Gerken, supra note 12, at 21–22.
142. See Davidson, supra note 138, at 598-600 (noting multiple dimensions of fragmentation).
143. See, e.g., California Map for Local Air District Websites, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/capcoa/dismap.htm [https://perma.cc/6ECK-4KPH] (last visited Sept. 12,
2018).
144. See, e.g., What Is Metro?, METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/
what-metro [https://perma.cc/8W9N-PG9V] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (describing Portland Metro,
which governs land use planning in the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area).
145. Purely local mechanisms, like interlocal agreements, also can alleviate these issues without
requiring state intervention. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001).
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upon part-time volunteers.146 While larger cities can afford a professionalized and
specialized staff, other local government administrative units are often overseen by
voluntary boards.147 A professional staff may support those boards—a town
planning commission, for example, may be supported by a professional planner—
but that staff is often skeletal, and some local governments rely primarily on the
episodic services of external consultants (and lawyers).148 Other local governments
have become so destitute that they cannot serve even basic public needs, let alone
hire staff or consultants for specialized tasks like resource management. 149 And
even with a strong professional staff, some key decision-makers are likely to be
people whose appointment requires no specialized knowledge and who work for
the government only when their day jobs are done.150
The reliance on volunteer staffing creates challenges with expertise.151 While
voluntary participants may be well-versed in the politics of the community, there is
no guarantee that they will have technical sophistication. Yet their decisions are
likely to implicate subject matter that demands that sophistication. Local
groundwater management boards, for example, are likely to make decisions in
reliance on complex, computer-based simulation models, each of which will likely
have uncertainties and debatable assumptions baked into its input data and internal
logic.152 A local volunteer board might have participants who understand modeling,
but such expertise is not particularly common.153 Nor will it be easy for a once-amonth volunteer with another job to develop that expertise. And while the state, in
its role as reviewer and overseer, might provide some help, sometimes it will be
easier for a state with more technically sophisticated staff to simply take the lead.
C. Self-Dealing
Local government’s reliance on volunteers raises other concerning questions:
who would be motivated to participate on a governing board, and how might their
146. See Davidson, supra note 138, at 623. Some state government agencies also rely on
volunteer commissions. Oregon’s land use planning scheme, for example, is overseen by a board of
essentially unpaid volunteers. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON’S STATEWIDE
PLANNING GOALS & GUIDELINES 1 (2010); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.495 (2008) (providing
for very small stipends).
147. See Davidson, supra note 138, at 608 (noting the prevalence of volunteer boards).
148. See, e.g., Vanessa Levesque et al., Planning for Sustainability in Small Municipalities: The
Influence of Interest Groups, Growth Patterns, and Institutional Characteristics, 37 J. PLAN. EDUC. &
RES. 6 (2017) (finding that most Maine towns lack a staff planner).
149. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014).
150. See Davidson, supra note 138, at 608.
151. These expertise disparities are not unique to the state-local relationship. See Stewart, supra
note 111, at 1218 (“[F]ederal health and environmental protection bureaucracies are generally larger
and more professional than their state and local counterparts.”).
152. See TARA MORAN, PROJECTING FORWARD: A FRAMEWORK FOR GROUNDWATER
MODEL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT (2016)
(describing the importance of groundwater models to SGMA implementation). For discussion of
modeling uncertainties and subjectivity, see Fine & Owen, supra note 56, at 921–33.
153. Fine & Owen, supra note 56, at 936.
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motivations affect their decision-making?154 The obvious answers are that at least
some participants are likely to have a personal stake in the subject matter of
decision-making and that they are likely to use their position to self-deal. With
groundwater, for example, some participants on governing boards may be water or
irrigation district managers or farmers who rely upon groundwater pumping.155 A
board composed of such people might arrive at particularly thoughtful decisions;
after all, its members are likely to understand long-term threats to the resource and
the implications of different regulatory approaches. But such a board also may
prioritize immediate needs over long-term sustainability, and it is likely to give little
weight to the needs of water users outside the agency’s jurisdiction, or to
environmental outcomes.156 Studies considering management of other resources—
particularly fisheries—suggest that this threat is very real.157
D. Factions and Salience
The likelihood of flawed administration is not a fatal critique of delegations to
local governments, for most theories of administrative law begin with the premise
that administrators are highly imperfect.158 Instead, a basic premise of our
administrative governance systems is that voters, either directly or, more likely,
through their elected representatives, will provide oversight and accountability for
administrative decision-makers.159 But voting also works rather differently at local
levels, and the differences have implications, not all of them positive, for the
potential performance of local delegates.
Studies of local voting patterns have revealed a variety of differences from
higher-level elections. Potential voters tend to have less awareness of local
elections.160 They tend to participate at lower rates.161 Votes are less likely to be
contested.162 And voters vote for different reasons. Unlike state and federal
elections, where the ideological sorting of political parties and individual charisma
154. See J. ERIC OLIVER, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL-SCALE
DEMOCRACY 90 (2012) (noting that governance “is typically hard and thankless work”).
155. See E-mail from Linda Esteli Mendez Barrientos, Ph.D. Student, Univ. of Cal. at Davis, to
author (Oct. 27, 2017, 02:06 PM) (on file with author) (describing her research into the composition
of GSA boards).
156. See Eric Helland & Andrew B. Whitford, Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction:
Evidence from the TRI, 46 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 403, 404 (2003) (“[W]e find systematic evidence
of free riding by jurisdictions when pollution can be more easily exported to neighboring states.”).
157. See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS (2004) (finding major problems with biased participation).
158. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 204
(7th ed. 2011).
159. See Newman v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]olitical accountability . . . is
the very premise of administrative discretion in all its forms.”).
160. The few voters who actually show up for local elections (if those elections do not coincide
with national elections) may be highly informed. See OLIVER, supra note 154, at 179–80.
161. See id. at 55.
162. John Gerring et al., Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-Level Analysis of
Electoral Contestation, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 574, 589 (2015).
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provide the key distinctions among candidates, local elections often turn on issues
like the preservation of landowners’ property values.163 Finally, the rules of voting
may be different. One-person-one-vote principles extend to city and county
elections, but not necessarily to elections carried out by special districts.164 Those
districts may instead allocate voting rights by measures like landownership, which
can give a powerful edge, or even unassailable political dominance, to small groups
of people.165
The consequences of these differences are difficult to discern and will likely
vary from place to place. Some commentators, echoing James Madison, have argued
that local governments are particularly prone to factionalism and elite capture.166
Others have argued that low participation rates in local government reflect a healthy
absence of partisanship and ideology; voters, in this view, are unlikely to participate
in local government because they are basically happy with it, not because they are
ignorant of the issues or have lost hope that their votes will exert any real
influence.167 But that optimistic view is most likely to hold true when local
governments are providing what political scientists refer to as unbiased
governance—that is, governance that provides relatively consistent service levels
across the population.168 When a small group of people has a strong stake in the
subject matter of governance—as is likely to be the case with school board elections,
for example, or natural resource governance—low issue salience and low voter
turnout mean that elections are unlikely to check special interest dominance.169
Of course, voting is not the only potential check on poor government agency
performance. At federal and state levels, procedural requirements, judicial review,
conflict of interest rules, and open government laws are all designed to provide
additional accountability. But these measures also can work differently at local
levels. Some local agencies lack conflict of interest rules, and it might be difficult to
find volunteers if such rules do exist. Additionally, reliance on contractors for basic
governance functions can create “porous line[s] between public and private at the
local level,” further diminishing the effectiveness of checks traditionally associated
with federal or state administrative law.170 Procedures may be highly informal, and
163. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4–6 (2001).
164. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (declining to extend one-person-one-vote principles
to a water and energy supply district); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719 (1973) (allowing water district voting that was weighted by landownership).
165. See Camille Pannu, Comment, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 257–58 (2012).
166. See Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 962 (2007) (“Local governments often give life to the Madisonian fear
of the tyranny of local majorities.”).
167. See OLIVER, supra note 154. But see David Schleicher, Why is There No Partisan Competition
in City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007) (questioning rosy views
of local democracy).
168. OLIVER, supra note 154, at 83.
169. Id. at 48, 83–85 (noting that the dynamics of school board elections are likely to be different
from those of city council elections).
170. Davidson, supra note 138, at 573.
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separation of powers, though foundational to federal and state law, “is a concept
foreign to municipal governance.”171
E. Ideological Relocation
Cooperative subfederalism also can relocate decisions to political
constituencies with systematically different ideologies. Perhaps the starkest divide
in American politics, which holds constant in nearly every state, is between liberal
cities and conservative outer suburbs and rural areas.172 Delegating authority from
urban state capitals to rural counties, towns, or special districts therefore can mean
trading a blue or purple decision-making site for one that is decidedly red. The
converse also is true; if establishing a cooperative regime means limiting traditional
local autonomy and empowering the state, then decision-making is likely to shift to
more centrist or liberal areas. That is not always the case; with air quality, for
example, many state-to-local subdelegations have gone from centrist or politically
conservative states to urban and more liberal cities or counties.173 But often,
particularly in the realms of environmental and natural resources law, delegations
will run in the opposite ideological direction, for the simple reason that most natural
resource exploitation occurs in rural areas.
Relocating decisions to different polities is both an advantage and a
disadvantage of cooperative subfederalism (and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of
traditional cooperative federalism). Traditional federalism theory often extolls the
advantages of having smaller political constituencies adapt broad programs to their
own distinctive preferences and needs.174 And state oversight provides some check,
at least in theory, on local governments’ ability to gut regulatory programs, and
provides some necessity for state and local authorities to hash out differences.175
But if the success of a program depends on at least a baseline level of commitment
to regulatory goals, then delegating implementation authority to anti-regulatory
administrators sometimes just won’t work.176 California’s groundwater management
experiments may yet provide a cautionary example of this principle. A core and
171. Id. at 38 (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.2d 565, 579 & n.16 (R.I. 2011); see also id. at 42
(“In nearly half the states, local agencies do not fall within the ambit of the relevant state APA.”).
172. See Justin Davidson, Cities v. Trump: Red State, Blue State? The Urban-Rural Divide Is
More Significant, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 18, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/theurban-rural-divide-matters-more-than-red-vs-blue-state.html [https://perma.cc/T6LV-EU4K].
173. See, e.g., Susan Carroll, Texas High Court Rejects City Air Pollution Rules, HOUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 30, 2016 (describing Houston’s clashes with the Texas Department of Environmental Quality,
some occurring during a period when Houston held authority to implement state air quality law); see also
Schragger, supra note 15, at 1190–91 (noting that state legislatures are often more conservative than
their constituencies).
174. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24, at 1268 (describing “microspheres of
autonomy”).
175. See generally id. (describing ways in which cooperative federalism compels federal-state
interactions).
176. As one Florida land use lawyer warned, “the rural areas, the folks on the fringes of town
and stuff, they thought this was some kind of communism . . . .” Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer
( July 21, 2017).
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rather optimistic premise of the new law is that local governments, many of which
for years declined to regulate groundwater use, will now be willing recipients of state
oversight and effective leaders at the new regulatory frontier.177 The accuracy of
that premise remains to be seen.
F. Changing the Role of the State
In addition to introducing a new set of actors into governance arrangements,
cooperative federalism also recasts the role of the states. No longer the delegates,
unless the program involves dual layers of delegation, they now occupy the
traditional federal role of delegator and overseer. That shift also has implications
for the potential success of governance programs.
In many ways, the implications of this alternative state role should not be as
dramatic as they might initially seem. The traditional rhetoric of federalism draws
stark contrasts between federal and state governance, but that rhetoric is often
overblown. The federal government is not actually a centralized, distant, and
monolithic entity adopting one-size-fits-all solutions, despite all the caricatures to
the contrary.178 States, as the discussion that follows explains in more depth, can be
somewhat removed from local conditions. And both levels of government share
certain structures in common, including bicameral legislatures, chief executives,
suites of professionalized regulatory agencies, and at least moderately similar
systems of administrative law.179 Similarly, while most states lack formal
constitutional doctrines that limit state incursions upon local authority, and thus
lack any analog for the legal limits of federalism, localism has very powerful political
appeal.180 The “political safeguards of localism” therefore can provide local
autonomy with more meaningful protection than constitutional doctrine ever
could.181 Consequently, the state role in cooperative subfederalism may be quite
similar to the federal role in traditional cooperative federalism regimes.
Nevertheless, there are meaningful differences between the states and the
federal government. Cataloguing all the relevant distinctions would require more
space than is worthwhile here,182 but even a partial sampling would include a few
177. Any lingering doubts about local authority to regulate groundwater were settled by Baldwin
v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). Yet strong local groundwater regulation
remained rare until the passage of SGMA. See MAC TAYLOR, LIQUID ASSETS: IMPROVING
MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE’S GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 9 (2010).
178. See generally Owen, supra note 70 (critiquing these caricatures).
179. For an explanation of both similarities and differences (though with somewhat greater
focus on the differences), see Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2014).
180. See Rodriguez, supra note 119.
181. Id. at 630 n.16 (coining this phrase). As Richard Schragger has noted, however, states’
respect for local governance is typically greater when that governance comes from rural or suburban
areas. See Schragger, supra note 15, at 1214 (discussing hostility toward Austin, Texas).
182. For a detailed account of differences, with particular focus on doctrines that authorize
greater state authority over local governments than the federal government has over states, see Briffault,
supra note 16, at 1335–44.
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key items. Perhaps most importantly, while the federal government now has a halfcentury of experience implementing many cooperative federalism programs, most
states lack analogous traditions.183 Governance does usually require some learning,
and state administrative agencies would start at a much lower point on that curve.
Additionally, because of the possibility of interstate competition, states may be more
susceptible to the influence of regulated entities, and therefore less able to provide
robust oversight, than their counterparts in federal agencies.184 Finally, states vary
dramatically in their political support for regulatory oversight and in the resources
they are willing to devote to the cause. That variance exists at the federal level too,
of course; dramatic swings can happen from one administration to the next. But the
dampening effect of a permanent civil staff with lasting institutional identities has
meant, so far at least, that a federal culture of state oversight has remained at least
moderately robust.185 A state with skeletal administrative resources would struggle
to establish that same culture.
IV. COOPERATIVE SUBFEDERALISM IN PRACTICE
The foregoing discussion shows that there are some reasons to think that
cooperative subfederalism will work and other reasons to think it will not. And while
California’s latest cooperative subfederalism program is still quite new, other
programs with longer track records have put the theoretical promises and perils of
cooperative subfederalism to the test. This Part reviews three such programs. For
each, I conducted interviews with government officials, private lawyers, and private
planners who have spent years in the implementation trenches.186 I draw upon those
interviews, and upon the written literature associated with each program, to offer

183. See supra Part I (noting that cooperative subfederalism programs exist but are not
abundant).
184. See Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, Facts Are Stubborn Things: An Empirical Reality
Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in Environmental Standard-Setting, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998). Saleska and Engel’s article is part of a large debate about
whether this race exists and, if it does, whether it is problematic. See Glicksman, supra note 1, at 736
n.94 (compiling sources on both sides).
185. See Telephone Interview with Cal. Local Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 17, 2017). He
explained:
[ J ]ust as an aside, it’s really disheartening to see EPA kind of getting dismantled right now,
because they have the expertise, they have the extremely dedicated staff, and they have an
internal culture of protecting the public health that I think is just a treasure for the country,
and I don’t know how many people realize that.
Id. For a theoretical account of the importance of this bureaucratic stability, see Matthew C. Stephenson,
Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008).
186. In total, I conducted twenty-two interviews, all by telephone, and also exchanged followup emails and had one follow-up call. Seven interview subjects had worked in Florida, six in Oregon,
and nine in California. I promised anonymity to all interview subjects. The Florida and Oregon
interviewing included people who had served as top staff or as political appointees in state agencies
responsible for land use planning, private attorneys who had represented developers, municipalities,
and local governments, and several non-attorneys who had held similar roles. Many of the interview
subjects had held several of these roles. The California air quality interviewees generally were current
administrative agency staff. Most were relatively senior. None were political appointees.
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several conclusions about how cooperative subfederalism can function in the real
world.
That research methodology creates some important limitations. Every
government program is unique in some ways, and while a study of three programs
demonstrates possibilities, it cannot produce conclusions generalizable across all
state and local relationships. Additionally, while my research method draws upon
several hundred years of governance experience—most of my interview subjects
have worked in their fields for decades—this was not a randomized and quantitative
test of a discrete hypothesis. What follows therefore is a compilation of informed
advice, not a proof. Nevertheless, that informed advice can help other researchers
and policymakers as they consider governance alternatives.
The discussion that follows also comes with one other overarching caveat. A
central premise of much of the legal literature on federalism, and on governance
more generally, is that governmental structure matters.187 Indeed, perhaps the most
important intellectual contribution of the United States’ founders was to accept the
inevitability of human flaws and to focus on creating governance systems that can
succeed even when individual leaders are self-aggrandizing.188 This Article shares
that basic orientation; I focus on governance structures (and procedures) rather than
individual behavior. Yet when I asked people what mattered most in helping a
cooperative subfederalism system succeed, human behavior was often the first
thing they wanted to talk about.189 That inclination, which was borne of years of
experience, provides a reminder that no matter how well a governance system is
structured, the quality of its leadership and the conduct of its participants both
remain crucially important.190
A. The Programs
1. Oregon Land Use
In 1973, the Oregon Legislature enacted, and Governor Tom McCall
enthusiastically signed, legislation creating a statewide system of land use
187. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (asserting that the structures of
federalism promote individual liberty); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (emphasizing the
importance of separation of powers).
188. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (“[T]he debates of the Constitutional
Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch
of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.”); see also
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–22 (1986) (tracing these ideas to Montesquieu).
189. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 19, 2017) (“[R]eally key to success was
having a respectful attitude.”); Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 11, 2017) (emphasizing
the importance of “the people on both the state end and the local end approaching any given situation
as a collaboration and trying to figure out how to help each other achieve their goals”).
190. See Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 11, 2017) (“Because at the end of the
day, people are what make things work or not, and it doesn’t matter how well-crafted some statute is
or some . . . org chart or some timeline if the people administering the program aren’t generally trying
to collaborate with one another.”).
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planning.191 The new legislation propelled Oregon to forefront of land use law
reform.192 For decades, in Oregon and elsewhere, land use planning was a local
responsibility—if it happened at all.193 In many states, that local primacy remains in
place.194 But Oregon’s law broke with tradition. Land use planning responsibility
would remain at local levels, but those local governments now had a state mandate
to develop binding plans, which needed to include “urban growth boundaries”
designed to limit suburban expansion and facilitate infill development.195 The urban
growth boundary requirement was just one of many ways in which the local plans
and plan updates had to be consistent with state statutes, and with an exceedingly
detailed set of state regulations.196 Additionally, the consistency determinations—
acknowledgements, in Oregon land use parlance—would be made by a state
administrative agency, through processes that would be subject to administrative
and judicial review and to the possibility of advocacy groups’ citizen suits.197 A
policy arena that had been dominated by local discretion was now highly legalized,
and the state was in control.
Forty-five years later, that same legal structure remains in place, and many
Oregonians credit it with encouraging sensible urbanization, protecting rural
landscapes, and maintaining Oregon’s distinctive quality of life.198 The program also
191. See PETER A. WALKER & PATRICK T. HURLEY, PLANNING PARADISE: POLITICS AND
VISIONING OF LAND USE IN OREGON (2011).
192. See Ed Sullivan, Oregon Blazes a Trail, in STATE AND REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING, supra note 69, at 51 (referring to Oregon as “one of the pioneers”).
193. John M. DeGrove, The Emergence of State Planning and Growth Management Systems: An
Overview, in STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING, supra note 69, at 1, 3 (“Before the
1970s, with the single exception of Hawaii, all states relied almost exclusively on local governments for
whatever planning took place.”).
194. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 140, at 45.
195. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS
& GUIDELINES 1 (2010), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/compilation_of_statewide_
planning_goals.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8RF-V8AX] (“Oregon´s statewide goals are achieved
through local comprehensive planning.”).
196. See id.
197. See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 56–64 (describing these processes).
198. See, e.g., KATHERINE H. DANIELS & EDWARD J. SULLIVAN, OREGON’S 40-YEAROLD INNOVATION: A REMARKABLE PLANNING PROGRAM FACES A MILESTONE—AND
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 5 (2013), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/Oregons_40_year_old_
innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS6Y-V35L] (“To see the obvious success of the state’s land-use
program over the past 40 years, one has only to drive through Oregon’s Willamette Valley and take
note of the remarkable extent of uncluttered, open working farm and forest landscapes that are close
to compact urban areas.”); DeGrove, supra note 193, at 7 (praising Oregon’s program). Many studies
have reached more qualified conclusions. See, e.g., Judith A. Dempsey & Andrew J. Plantinga, How Well
Do Urban Growth Boundaries Contain Development? Results for Oregon Using a Difference-in-Difference
Estimator, 43 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 996 (2013) (finding real but limited effects on growth);
Myung-Jin Jun, The Effects of Oregon’s Urban Growth Boundary on Urban Development Patterns and
Commuting, 7 J. URB. STUD. 1333 (2003) (finding that Portland’s UGB redirected suburbanization
across the Columbia River into Washington); Jae Hong Kim, Measuring the Containment and Spillover
Effects of Urban Growth Boundaries: The Case of the Portland Metropolitan Area, 44 GROWTH &
CHANGE 650 (2013); Jeffrey D. Kline & Ralph J. Alig, Does Land Use Planning Slow the Conversion of
Forest and Farmlands?, 30 J. URB. & REGIONAL POL’Y 3 (1999) (finding success at concentrating
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remains iconic in the worlds of land use planning and law.199 Its supporters aren’t
just Portlandian environmentalists, though support in Oregon’s largest metropolis
is stronger than it is in most other parts of the state.200 Much of the original impetus
came from farmers who worried that suburban expansion would crowd out their
livelihood, and some construction advocates liked the increased certainty that the
program provided.201
Despite that fame and support, implementation has not always been
smooth.202 Many of Oregon’s rural areas have chafed at the program’s
constraints.203 In 2004, Oregon voters passed, with strong statewide support, a
ballot initiative known as Measure 37, which allowed landowners to seek
compensation for any new government regulation that restricted their ability to
develop their property.204 Measure 37 was part of a broader national movement
against government regulation, but it also reflected widespread perceptions that
Oregon land use law had become somewhat overbearing.205 Three years later, after
seeing the chaos of Measure 37 in action, Oregon voters approved a second ballot
measure limiting Measure 37’s reach, but they did not completely eliminate
compensation requirements.206 A somewhat compromised version of Oregon’s
original land use planning system thus remains in place.
2. Florida Land Use
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Florida enacted a series of laws that placed it
alongside Oregon at the vanguard of statewide land use planning.207 At a general
development within urban growth boundaries but more uncertainty on other effects). The program
also has no shortage of critics. See, e.g., A Look Back at Oregon’s Senate Bill 100, ANTIPLANNER ( June
3, 2013), http://ti.org/antiplanner/?p=7956 [https://perma.cc/7A2W-A3XV].
199. See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191, at 22–23 (including several quotes describing the
program’s prominence); DeGrove, supra note 193, at 4 (describing Oregon’s program as “the most
comprehensive of all the state efforts” and stating that it “has had the greatest influence on other state
systems”).
200. See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191, at 12–14.
201. See id. at 50–53 (describing farmers’ support); id. at 73–75 (describing industry support).
As one practicing attorney put it: “[ Y ]ou can’t use ‘the character of the neighborhood’ or some bullshit
like that to frustrate housing.” Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Aug. 14, 2017).
202. Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017) (“A lot of the development interests
hated it. So the legislative conservatives consistently jerked DLCD, the department, and the commission
around.”).
203. See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191, at 204–12 (describing opposition in southern
Oregon).
204. See JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA & THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG, THE TRACK RECORD ON
TAKINGS LEGISLATION: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRACY’S LABORATORIES 27–32 (2008) (describing the
passage of Measure 37).
205. See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191, at 111–55 (exploring why Measure 37 passed).
206. See ECHEVERRIA & HANSEN-YOUNG, supra note 204, at 42–45 (describing the passage of
Measure 49).
207. See Thomas G. Pelham, The Florida Experience: Creating a State, Regional, and Local
Comprehensive Planning Process, in STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING, supra note 69, at
94, 95–97; Nancy Stroud, A History and New Turns in Florida’s Growth Management Reform, 45
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 398–406 (2012).
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level, Florida’s system was similar to that of Oregon: local governments were
required to develop binding land use plans and to submit those plans to a state
agency for review and approval.208 Florida’s land use planning system also
established “concurrency” requirements, which required local governments to
ensure that needed public infrastructure would be in place to support
development,209 and it established interjurisdictional coordination requirements for
plans and large projects with potential cross-jurisdictional impacts.210
Like Oregon’s system, Florida’s was controversial, and that controversy
ultimately proved its undoing. Construction and real estate industries are important
just about everywhere, but they are especially important in Florida; many
participants in land use planning simply refer to Florida as a “growth state.”211 By
design, the Growth Management Act sometimes limited that growth—in one
famous episode, a court actually ordered a completed but noncompliant housing
development torn down212—and over time, developers’ and local governments’
frustrations with state oversight built toward a breaking point.213 Even sympathetic
commentators charged that some requirements had been implemented poorly or
counterproductively.214 They also identified positive outcomes, including increased
prevalence of, and competence with, planning and a more clearly defined process
for resolving land use disputes.215 But the exalted tones in which many
208. Tom Pelham, Twenty Years Later: Three Perspectives on the Evolution of Florida’s 1985
Growth Management Act: First Perspective, 58 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2006).
209. See Pelham, supra note 207, at 103–04, 107–08.
210. Id. at 99–102.
211. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 14, 2017) (“Florida is a growth
state . . . . [T]he money that flows from development is critically important to local governments and
states at every level.”); see also David Powell, Twenty Years Later: Three Perspectives on the Evolution of
Florida’s 1985 Growth Management Act: Second Perspective, 58 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 7, 8 (describing
intense development pressures).
212. Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“The
statutory rule is that if you build it, and in court it later proves inconsistent, it will have to come down.”).
213. See Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 21, 2017) (“I used to attend the interviews
with all the legislative candidates, and it was incredible . . . all but two, Democrats and Republicans, said
we’ve got to deal with the Department of Community Affairs. They’re out of control. We’ve got to do
away with the act.”).
214. See, e.g., Richard Grosso, Florida’s Growth Management Act: How Far We Have Come, and
How Far We Have Yet to Go, 20 NOVA L. REV. 589 (1996); Pelham, supra note 208, at 5
(“[I]ntergovernmental coordination has been a major disappointment.”); David L. Powell, Growth
Management: Florida’s Past as Prologue for the Future, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 519, 531–43 (2001)
(identifying a series of problems and calling for reforms); Stroud, supra note 207, at 407 (observing that
concurrency requirements sometimes increased sprawl).
215. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 211; Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017)
(noting improvements in intergovernmental coordination). Even one of the most critical interviewees
argued that the regulatory, top-down elements of the act’s structure had brought important benefits:
One time we had a group of probably about fifteen of us sitting around a table, and there
was the agency secretary at the time who was not really sure he liked the . . . command and
control process. [He] said, “Do you think we could have gotten this far . . . with planning in
the state of Florida had it not been for the top-down regulatory process?” And all but him
said that it could not have gotten this far. We could not have achieved what we did had it
not been for using more of a stick than a carrot.
Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 21, 2017).
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commentators describe Oregon land use planning are largely absent from
discussions of Florida.
Eventually, frustrations with the program came to head. Over time, state
administrators asserted the program with less and less force,216 and then a
resurgence of state support coincided with the Great Recession, which hit Florida
particularly hard.217 Meanwhile, power in Florida’s state government was shifting to
the political right, and the Department of Community Affairs—the state agency in
charge of approving local plans—became a politicians’ piñata, as did growth
management more generally.218 In 2011, the Florida Legislature dramatically
amended the Growth Management Act, curtailing the system of state oversight and
placing a bookend on Florida’s experiment with cooperative subfederalism.219
3. California Air Quality
My third area of study involves air quality planning in California. As described
earlier, the federal Clean Air Act requires states to generate legally enforceable
plans—known as state implementation plans, or SIPs—that will achieve compliance
with national ambient air quality standards.220 California subdelegates that authority
to local air districts, some of which generate SIP updates that the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) then reviews, approves, and submits to EPA.221 The air
districts vary in their scale—the smallest have just one or two staff members, while
the largest have hundreds—and some are departments of county governments

216. Powell, supra note 211, at 9 (“There has been a steady decline in the DCA’s
assertiveness . . . .”).
217. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 21, 2017) (“[W]e had a return of a secretary
to the agency who had almost become more and more regulatory . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Fla.
Attorney ( July 20, 2017) (noting that in Secretary Tom Pelham’s second term, “the law was very
strong”).
218. See An Obituary: Growth Management 1985–2011, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 5, 2011. The
critiques began before the economic crash. See Powell, supra note 214, at 531 (quoting harsh criticism
from Governor Jeb Bush).
219. See Kacie A. Hohnadell, Community Planning Act: The End of Meaningful Growth
Management in Florida, 42 STETSON L. REV. 715, 727–31 (2013).
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). California law establishes independent requirements, including
stricter standards, but regulators told me that federal law drives decision-making “because the federal
Clean Air Act has more teeth in it in terms of sanctions.” Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality
Regulator (Aug. 23, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 17, 2017)
(“It’s the federal ozone standard that really drives our process.”).
221. See Fine & Owen, supra note 56, at 946–47.
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while others are independent local governance entities.222 The independent entities
still have governing boards composed of city and county elected officials.223
Figure 2. California Air Districts Map
From https://www.arb.ca.gov/capcoa/dismap.htm

While California air quality planning shares with Oregon and Florida land use the
combination of local planning and state oversight, the program is different in several
key ways. Initially, it is a double delegation program. EPA oversees the state’s
efforts, and there is no analogous federal role in land use planning.224 Additionally,

222. Compare, e.g., IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/AirPollution/ [https://perma.cc/8BQT-EHY8] (last visited Sept. 12,
2018) (describing the Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, which is a department of the
county government), with About, S. COAST AQMD, http://www.aqmd.gov/nav/about
[https://perma.cc/6EHP-GF4Z] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (“The SCAQMD is the air pollution
control agency for all of Orange County and the urban portions of Los Angeles, Riverside, and San
Bernardino counties.”).
223. See, e.g., Governing Board, S. COAST AQMD, http://www.aqmd.gov/home/governingboard [https://perma.cc/AH3X-8EB5] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).
224. See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265,
280–81 (2009) (describing EPA’s oversight role).
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California’s air quality regulators have a somewhat less controversial task than their
counterparts in land use planning. While the goals of land use planning are often
profoundly contested, and some critics even question whether it makes sense to
plan at all,225 almost everyone wants clean air.226 That task also is more discrete.
Although air quality regulation is technically complex and implicates a wide variety
of economic activities, the ultimate goal—compliance with a few numeric
standards—is fairly clear.227
Perhaps because of that clarity of purpose, California air quality planning has
never assumed as high or controversial a profile as land use planning in Florida or
Oregon. It also has achieved some success. In the decades since the Clean Air Act
was passed, air quality in most parts of California has improved dramatically.228 But
California’s air quality planning history still has not been easy. State and local
regulators often express frustration with federal mobile source controls, which
preempt state and local regulation and which state and local regulators perceive as
insufficiently stringent.229 And despite major emissions reductions, violations of
federal and state air quality standards still are routine events in the Los Angeles basin
and in much of the Central Valley, and the problems are likely to persist for years
to come.230
B. The Lessons
A study of three programs is not a comprehensive survey of governance. But
the officials and staff who have implemented these programs do have decades of
experience and a track record of accomplishments (and failures). The programs
therefore can support tentative conclusions about the viability of cooperative
225. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning,
14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (2000).
226. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 6, 2017) (“[I]t helps that at
least in our work . . . even someone that maybe says I think there should be less regulation . . . those
people are still in agreement with saying, well, we don’t want to see brown skies and people coughing
up a lung.”); Environment, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170902203211/http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx]
(last visited Sept. 2, 2017) (showing support for air quality protection).
227. See NAAQS Table, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteriaair-pollutants/naaqs-table [https://perma.cc/T3PB-JFTV] (last updated Dec. 20, 2016).
228. See Tony Barboza, New Attack on California’s Dirty Air, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015,
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-what-new-smog-rules-mean-for-california-airpollution-20150930-story.html [https://perma.cc/4KPT-S96V] (showing dramatic reductions in ozone
levels in the Los Angeles basin); History of Air Resources Board, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/html/40th_history.htm [https://perma.cc/J6WT-UJGJ] (last updated
Aug. 29, 2017) (“Californians today breathe the cleanest air since measurements have been recorded.”).
229. See Engine Mfrs. Assoc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)
(describing the preemption regime); Interview with California Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13,
2017) (“It’s increasingly a source of frustration that we’re called upon to reduce emissions all over the
place . . . and yet EPA is not . . . reducing emissions for sources under their control.”).
230. Associated Press, Los Angeles and Bakersfield Top List of Worst Air Pollution in the Nation,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-air-pollution-report20160420-story.html [https://perma.cc/QU3H-74AY].
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subfederalism and the conditions under which it can succeed. I summarize key
findings in the subsections below.
1. The Viability of Cooperative Subfederalism
The most important lesson is simple: cooperative federalism can deliver on its
theoretical promise. Participants in cooperative subfederalism programs generally
agreed that a balance of local expertise and state oversight is a good model for
governance.231 As one air quality official put it, “the state-local hybrid model worked
very well and guarded against undue influence applied at either level.”232 They also
generally believed that their programs had delivered concrete benefits.233 Even
participants in Florida’s program, which was the least politically durable of the three
I reviewed, credit the program with advancing Florida’s approach to land use
planning, providing predictability to developers, and avoiding or improving illconceived development projects.234 Participants did not advocate cooperative
subfederalism as a universal governance model; as one noted, “[i]f there is nothing
unique across the state. . . it would be best to have the state [regulate].” But they did
all agree that the model has value.235
The reasons for this support echo many of the theoretical arguments for
traditional cooperative federalism, and they respond to many of the concerns that
pervade local governance literature. For example, interviewees consistently agreed
with the premise that governance seems more legitimate when it comes from
nearby.236 Somewhat surprisingly, this view holds true even when the state capital
231. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Local Air Quality Regulator (Oct. 26, 2017)
(extolling the virtues of local governance, but noting that “[i]t does provide a check . . . to make sure
that things are happening at the local level”); Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Oct. 16, 2017) (“I
think the best thing is to have what I always call a federal system.”). The weakest endorsement came
from a Florida land use lawyer, who, after providing a lengthy explanation of pros and cons, concluded
by saying, “I have to fall back on . . . ‘it depends.’” E-mail from Fla. Land Use Lawyer to author
(Oct. 11, 2017, 09:03 PST) (on file with author).
232. E-mail from Local Air Quality Official to author (Oct. 11, 2017, 08:20 PST) (on file with
author). He went on to explain:
Spreading the risks/rewards/tasks/responsibilities to shared partnerships between state and
local also avoids or ameliorate sudden program shifts caused by a single court case, piece of
legislation, executive management, etc. There is a griping that goes on at the local level that
“those jerks at the state don’t understand our situation.” While this can be true, in a way,
having the state focused on the end goals of a program and keeping the pressure on with
that focus is a great thing over time. And speaking from the state level, it is simply unwieldy
for a state agency to try to do essentially local tasks all over the state.
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Or. Planner (Sept. 12, 2017) (“If [channeling urbanization] is the
policy goal, I don’t see how you could accomplish it any other way.”).
233. E.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Sept. 20, 2017) (“I’m a big supporter. I think
it’s a great thing for Oregon.”).
234. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 211, at 9–10; Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney (Sept. 20,
2017). The attorney, who had spent much of his career representing developers, repeatedly emphasized
the importance of a predictable and clear process.
235. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator ( July 20, 2017).
236. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2017) (“[M]ost people involved in
governance believe that the best government is the one that’s closest to you, your house, your
neighborhood, your town.”).
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isn’t distant at all; one former Oregon government official, for example,
commented on how governance from Metro, which is a regional governance
authority in the Portland metropolitan area,237 strikes locals as preferable to
governance from the state capitol, which is a mere hour’s drive from Portland’s
downtown.238
Another classic trope of both federalism and localism and is that localized
governments will have a better grasp of local conditions and issues.239 Participants
in cooperative subfederalism programs agreed with this claim.240 “What the local
level brings,” as one air quality planner put it, “is . . . a better real-world handle on
what’s going on.” State-level employees generally agreed: as a California Air
Resources Board employee put it, “the air districts know their local sources and
their local community groups, industry, etc., much better than we ever do so on a
statewide level.”241 As that last quote suggests, the heightened knowledge was
closely tied to accessibility. As one Oregon attorney explained, regulated entities
“are the ones in the community who . . . the city council and planning commission
members and the city staff see at the Rotary clubs and . . . go to church with, the
store. I think that’s just a real natural thing.”242 This access to local knowledge, they
believed, was crucially important to the success of a regulatory program.243 A
California air quality planner summarized this conventional view:
I always think that local administration is preferable, because . . . we’re
closer to the constituents, we’re closer to the public. It’s easier for
somebody to come by my office to talk to me about an issue than it is to
go down to Sacramento. Just the feedback I always get from folks is, they
like having a local person—not just the public, but also the regulated
community . . . . I know that the staff at senior levels at the Air Resources
Board, they’ve said . . . “you guys are closer to the issues you have
locally” . . . they like to defer to us as much as they can.”244
Agreement with this claim, however, partially explains why interviewees saw
important benefits from state oversight. To them, greater accessibility to local
237. See METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov [https://perma.cc/358A-SKAB] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2018).
238. See Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2017). Our exchange appears below:
Lawyer: And there was a sense that the Metro planner, who’s maybe only fifteen miles from
your county courthouse or city hall, is more accessible to you than the planner in Salem.
Me: The proximity argument—I mean, Salem’s what, an hour from Portland?
Lawyer: Uh huh . . . . It seems much farther away.
Id.
239. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576–77 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 13, 2017) (noting that developers
are “more likely to be connected to, you know, county commissioners, local government officials . . .”).
241. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 18, 2017).
242. Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017).
243. See Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017) (“[M]y agency, at
least, has worked pretty well with industry, because . . . you can’t adopt a regulation that’s impossible . . .
[and] they’re the experts in their various realms.”).
244. Telephone Interview with Cal. Local Air Quality Regulator (Oct. 26, 2017).
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influence was a double-edged sword. Local governments, they noted, could be
overly solicitous of regulated entities. One planner from rural Oregon bluntly
summarized the general view: “Developers know they’ll have more success at the
local level than at the state.”245 Local governments also could get caught in “the
race-to-the-bottom effect that is so prevalent in local land use and zoning decisions
as local governments vie for new development to enhance their tax bases.”246 And
their focus could be overly parochial. As one Florida attorney somewhat
sarcastically put it, local government officials “will never do a good job of planning
outside their boundaries. They consider it a violation of their oath of office, I
think.”247
Interviewees agreed that the state offered a valuable role in checking these
local tendencies.248 States could serve as referees, helping local governments resolve
interjurisdictional disputes.249 They also could give local government officials a
useful excuse for imposing sensible regulatory restrictions.250 As another Florida
attorney explained, “I’ve heard over and over . . . that local elected officials might
not feel empowered enough to stand up for some of the good planning that was
happening, but if they could sort of blame it on the state it gave them more
backbone.”251 A California air quality regulator made a similar point:
245. Telephone Interview with Or. Planner (Sept. 12, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017) (“The development community is going to have more influence at the
local level and some local governments are more prone to that than others.”); Telephone Interview
with Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017) (“[O]f course, it can lead to bad results where a favored developer is
given some approval that another developer is denied based on substantially similar
circumstances . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 14, 2017) (“Yes, capture’s always
a problem because . . . you know, who has the money has the power.”). Interviewees did note that some
local jurisdictions are intensely opposed to development, which creates its own problems, and that
sometimes a state legislature (particularly in Florida) can become aggressively anti-regulatory. See,
e.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017) (describing the politics of Corvallis,
Oregon).
246. E-mail from Fla. Attorney to author (Oct. 11, 2017, 09:22 PST) (on file with author).
247. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017).
248. No one made this claim about Florida’s current state government. As one private attorney
put it, “at the state level right now . . . the developers have all the cards . . . . So the state legislature is
hostile to local government right now, extremely hostile to local governments that say no to
their friends, extremely hostile and unabashedly very up front about it.” Telephone Interview with
Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017). As another put it:
I strongly believe that lobbying by special interest groups, development groups in particular,
has a big impact at the local level, and that’s one of the reasons why we need state review
and oversight. But when you shift the decision-making up to the state level, you’re going to
get the same political games that would be played.
Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 19, 2017).
249. E-mail from Fla. Attorney to author (Oct. 11, 2017, 09:22 PST) (on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Sept. 15, 2017) (“[T]hose are some of the most unpopular
decisions that the state makes, is saying no to communities that are pushing, pushing, pushing, trying
to put development on their periphery to capture a market.”); see also Gillette, supra note 145, at 190–91
(explaining this concern’s importance to local government theorists).
250. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017) (“Many local governments wanted
someone to blame.”).
251. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 14, 2017). Another attorney described a
somewhat different dynamic:
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[W]e’re kind of caught in the middle all the time here, by design . . . we
have a pretty conservative board . . . and they have industry’s back, and
they want to know that we’re doing everything we can to reduce or
minimize the impacts to industry. But of course, we always feel like we
have responsibility to the public for . . . the public health aspects of all
this.”252
State and federal oversight, he explained, helped his staff maintain an appropriate
balance.253 State officials emphasized similar dynamics. “[W]e are certainly willing,”
one put it, “to give them cover.”254
Interviewees also consistently identified the capacity challenges of local
government as a crucial reason for state involvement. As many of them pointed out,
the resources available to local governments tend to vary dramatically, and “having
adequate funding is always a challenge for local governments.”255 While some urban
governments have abundant resources available,256 many local units—particularly
small cities or counties in rural areas, where, sometimes, “the guy who does the plan
also does the building inspections, also does the budget, and also does fleet
maintenance”—lack the resources to staff up a sophisticated governance
initiative.257 This is particularly true if governance requires some technical
sophistication. As one local air quality regulator put it, the state is “where all the big
modeling computers are, where all the Ph.D.s are.”258 Consequently, and as the
following Section discusses in more depth, interviewees consistently identified state
support for local decision-making as an essential element of a successful program.

If you were a county commissioner and . . . your builder friend that contributed to your
campaign wanted to build in an environmentally sensitive area, you didn’t think it was a good
idea, but you were worried about getting your campaign contribution the next time around,
you could say yes knowing that it would be set up for state review and then, you know, they
might question it, so . . . in some respects it was helpful to local governments, so they didn’t
always have to be the bad guy.
Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 13, 2017).
252. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 17, 2017).
253. Id. (“We have EPA telling us here are your marching orders, and that’s what we tell the
board . . . . It’s always easier that way. Yeah, that dynamic plays out all the time.”).
254. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 18, 2017).
255. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 13, 2017).
256. Not all do. See Anderson, supra note 149.
257. Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney (Sept. 20, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 21, 2017) (“[W ]e get the mandates directed towards us and we have
to figure out how we’re going to fund it locally . . . . That creates a lot of problems for us. Our boards
really have problems with that.”); Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 11, 2017) (“[ Y ]ou
have . . . hundreds of small cities and counties that do not have the financial wherewithal to
plan . . . . They basically just . . . asked applicants ‘what do you want’ and then they kind of did it.”);
Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Sept. 15, 2017) (“[I]t’s an issue for small rural communities
that . . . you know, sometimes they have a planner, sometimes their planner is the city recorder who’s
also the public works director.”).
258. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017). She noted that two
of the largest air districts in California are partial exceptions to this statement.
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In summary, experienced practitioners of cooperative subfederalism agreed,
almost unanimously, that it offers a promising balance of state and local authority.259
They also agreed for reasons responsive to the classic concerns of federalism and
local government theory; cooperative subfederalism, in their view, provides
promising mechanisms for facilitating inter-local collaboration, countering interest
group influence, and bolstering the financial resources available to local
government, all while retaining key benefits of localism. That might sound like a
rather hum-drum affirmation of old theory, except for a twist. My interview subjects
were not describing the allocation of authority between the federal government and
the states, nor were they affirming some widely-discussed model of local
governance. Instead, they were extending old arguments to a new context; this form
of state-local relationship has never really entered into the traditional federalism
literature, and it exists but is far from ubiquitous on the ground.260 If cooperative
subfederalism programs were to become as common as interview subjects suggested
they should be, state and local governance would be dramatically changed.
2. The Intervening State
While interviewees agreed about the value of cooperative subfederalism, they
also agreed that implementation is not easy. As one participant explained,
“there’s a lot of tension and friction—a lot of pushing and shoving—in those
relationships . . . . One of the big challenges to policy makers is how to protect and
enhance the working relationships between state and local governments in a sharedpowers regime.”261 Other interviewees agreed, describing the state-local relationship
as “naturally a tense one” and noting that “it requires constant attention to keep it
diplomatic.”262 These observations are entirely consistent with the written literature
on land use regulation in Florida and Oregon. Of all the lessons that emerge from
that writing, none is clearer than the basic point that cooperative state-local
governance is difficult and politically fraught work.263 And the track record of
cooperative subfederalism programs—some have crumbled and others have never
gotten started—also suggests that implementation is almost always an uphill
climb.264
So, if cooperative subfederalism offers the promise but no certainty of good
governance, what sets apart the systems with good odds of succeeding from those
that fail? Participants identified many features, and they did not always agree. In
259. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 698–703 (summarizing classic rationales for cooperative
federalism).
260. See supra Part I.
261. E-mail from Fla. Attorney to author (Oct. 11, 2017, 09:22 PST) (on file with author).
262. Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Aug. 29, 2017).
263. See, e.g., WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191 (describing numerous episodes of state-local
tension).
264. See Zirschky, supra note 71, at 2 (explaining that Maine’s cooperative sub-federalism
program went twenty-five years without any local takers); supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text
(describing the demise of Florida’s Growth Management Act).
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particular, questions about the importance of clear and specific legal mandates
produced a range of views,265 as did my questions about whether programs should
be broad and integrative or narrow and focused.266 Practitioners also disagreed
about the value of litigation from non-governmental advocacy groups.267 But their
recommendations and the written literature discussing these programs did coalesce
around one particularly important element of institutional design. A cooperative
subfederalism system requires intensive, ongoing interaction between state and local
government, often to the point of altering traditional boundaries between state and
local roles.
That assertion runs contrary to some key threads of traditional federalism
theory. The Supreme Court, for example, has emphasized division, not overlap.268
Federalism, in the Court’s oft-expressed vision, succeeds largely because we carve
out spaces in which states can act without federal interference.269 It is that
autonomous space, both the Court and commentators often opine, that allows
states to serve as democracy’s laboratories, check the power of the center, and
compete for mobile citizens.270 Cooperative federalism is, of course, a partial
rejection of this view; it presumes that either the federal government or the states

265. Many interviewees emphasized the importance of clear, bright-line rules that provide clear
goals for local government and certainty for regulated entities. E.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Air
Quality Regulator (Aug. 23, 2017) (supporting clear legal mandates “so there’s no debate over what
needs to be done”); Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017) (emphasizing the
importance of certainty for developers and noting that its current absence is “a real problem”);
Telephone Interview with Or. Planner (Sept. 12, 2017) (“People appreciate the certainty that the land
use regulations have provided.”). Others emphasized the importance of flexibility to adapt to particular
circumstances. E.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Attorney ( July 21, 2017) (“[Y]ou lost that freedom
to kind of cut a break to a county that was maybe 95% but not 100% there, and everyone had to meet
100 without the same level of expertise and money, and that was one of the factors that brought it to
the end.”). And many emphasized the value of both while acknowledging the tensions between these
goals. E.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Sept. 15, 2017) (asserting, while laughing, that it is
important to “set some clear standards” while also “not overdoing it”). The only clear conclusion that
emerges is that balancing specificity and flexibility is, as one Oregon attorney put it, “a constant battle.”
Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney ( July 25, 2017).
266. Compare, e.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017) (“[T]he reason it didn’t
work is because we couldn’t pry our fingers off covering all the issues . . . .”), with Telephone Interview
with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 14, 2017) (“Don’t focus on one thing. You’ve got to look at planning from a
holistic perspective.”).
267. Some viewed the threat of third-party suits as a crucial incentive for compliance,
particularly when the state’s commitment to implementation flagged. Others viewed citizen suits as
drivers of excessive legalization. See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 191 (echoing this overlegalization
critique).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (emphasizing the importance
of “a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”).
269. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is an essential attribute of the
States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere
of authority.”).
270. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (describing the virtues of divided
federalism).
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can pursue a task, and it calls for federal oversight of state action.271 Nevertheless,
one might still think that even in a cooperative federalism system, state autonomy
ought to be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.272 And one might
readily export the same idea to cooperative subfederalism: we might conclude that
its benefits will be maximized if states delegate authority and then step back, leaving
local governments to act with maximal autonomy.
Other traditional arguments for cooperative federalism—and, by extension,
for cooperative subfederalism—also suggest a largely hands-off role for higher-level
authorities. If, as some scholars have suggested, a key purpose of federalism is to
allow higher-level governments to achieve their policy goals without overstretching
their resources, then leaving the lower-level governments alone might seem like a
crucial first step.273 Similarly, if an important goal of a federalist system is producing
clear lines of accountability—to avoid the “maze of interlocking jurisdictions” that
Ronald Reagan once lamented—then maintaining clear boundaries also would seem
important.274 Again, a cooperative regime is a partial rejection of these priorities;
one of its defining elements is administrative review of state or local decisions.
Nevertheless, hands-on, continuing state involvement in local action might seem to
defeat much of the purpose of a cooperative subfederalism governance structure.275
In a wide variety of ways, however, participants in cooperative subfederalism
programs rejected this vision of intergovernmental separation. Instead, they
credited the successes of their programs to robust and continuous systems of
interaction, to governance structures that would seem to blur intergovernmental
lines, and to major state investments in both empowering and supporting—as well
as demanding—local governance.276 And when they spoke of their programs’
struggles, a recurring theme was the lack of state investment and involvement in
local governance. One comment sums up the general consensus: “the state has to
be participating early and often.”277

271. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (subjecting state plans to federal review and, possibly,
replacement).
272. See Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (“When
interpreting other [cooperative federalism statutes], we have not been reluctant to leave a range of
permissible choices to the States . . . .”).
273. See Stewart, supra note 111, at 1196 (identifying the federal government’s “limited
implementation and enforcement resources” as a reason for cooperative federalism programs).
274. Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States, State of the Union Address ( Jan. 26,
1982), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42687 [https://perma.cc/N8P2-NAFF].
Reagan went on to say that voters “don’t know where to turn for answers, who to hold accountable,
who to praise, who to blame, who to vote for or against.” Id.
275. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1617 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that centralized federal control would thoroughly undermine cooperative
federalism).
276. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Staff Member, Cal. Air Pollution Control Officers Ass’n
(Sept. 1, 2017) (“There needs to be sort of an ongoing co-mingling of staff and ideas . . . .”). For a
somewhat analogous governance vision, in which the institutional structures of governance are adapted
on an ongoing basis to particular tasks, see Freeman & Farber, supra note 91.
277. Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Sept. 15, 2017).
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One recurring example of this theme involves communication. Each of the
systems I studied requires local governments to develop plans and then submit
those plans to the state for review and approval. The state could leave local
governments alone to develop plans, waiting for their submission much like a
professor waiting for the first draft of a research paper and trying to avoid
micromanagement of his student’s work. But no one recommended doing that.278
Instead, both local and state staff consistently talked about the importance of
communication even before plans were due.279 One Florida lawyer, for example,
explained the crucial importance of sharing drafts with the state prior to formal
submission, and thus giving the state the opportunity for early feedback.
Even though . . . my clients got their ox gored an awful lot on that, I
thought from a policy perspective it did a good job of just getting the issues
on the table at the front end and creating a space for local governments
and the state and any private interests or public interests . . . to try to work
things out prior to the actual final local approval of the plan amendment.280
Other interviewees emphasized the importance of maintaining multiple lines
of communication, with staff, executives, and oversight boards all maintaining
contact.281 “You can have one or two of those relationships not going so well,” one
air quality regulator observed, “but the third can still be fine . . . . [T]here could be
a disagreement at the executive level but staff is still working together on very
specific issues.”282 And frequency mattered. As both state and local air district staff
noted, the California Air Resources Board has frequent calls with its districts; with
one particular district, a weekly call has been occurring for about fifteen years.283
Both state and local staff viewed this frequent communication as a very positive
thing.
Similarly, both state and local staff consistently agreed that the state, rather
than viewing its delegations to local governments as labor-saving devices, needed to
278. See Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Sept. 15, 2017) (asserting that one of “the
worst situations” occurs if “the state isn’t involved early and then comes in toward the end and raises
all sorts of objections”); Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Planner (Sept. 1, 2017) (“[Y]ou
can’t just turn the locals loose and turn the state loose, and the only time they get together is when
someone submits a plan, and it gets either rejected or approved.”).
279. E.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Planner (Sept. 12, 2017) (“[ W ]here I saw success was
where there was early participation on the part of . . . field representatives or even the Salem
specialists . . . .”). Another regulator explained:
[B]ecause of working relationships we’ve developed over the years at both ARB and our
local regional office of EPA . . . they’re willing to take . . . a day or two and . . . look through
the documents saying, “Yes, this is all looking good, hey, we just have a question here. It’s
not necessarily wrong, but maybe if you could expand this it will help us when we get to the
in-depth review.”
Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 6, 2017).
280. Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer ( July 11, 2017).
281. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 23, 2017).
282. Id.
283. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 20, 2017) ([W]ith the San
Joaquin Valley, we have had a weekly call with them on Tuesdays . . . since like 2001.”); Telephone
Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017) (noting those same calls).
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invest heavily in developing local capacity, particularly for smaller (and often rural)
local governments. Some of that support can come as funding.284 Sometimes it
involves developing educational programs and publishing guidance documents.285
Sometimes it could be model plans that local governments could use as templates.286
Sometimes it means taking field trips to far-flung parts of the state, either to gather
information287 or to allow the locals to see state decision-making in action.288
Throughout the interviews, the importance of state support for local governance
was a recurring theme, as were complaints about problems that arose when that
state support was insufficient.289
In other circumstances, states went beyond providing grants and education
and actually helped staff up local governance initiatives. In California, for example,
many air districts rely on state staff to complete some of the more technical elements
284. E.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 21, 2017) (“So if the state
is coming out with a new program that’s going to be handled by local entities, there really needs to be
funding identified for it . . . . I think . . . it generally should come from the state.”).
285. E.g., OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO
LAND USE PLANNING FOR SMALL CITIES AND COUNTIES IN OREGON (2007); Telephone Interview
with Fla. Attorney ( July 20, 2017) (“[I]n my bureau, we took it upon ourselves to initiate guidance
letters, sometimes requested by local government. And that was critical . . . .”); Telephone Interview
with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2017) (“[T]he state has always had a training program for new elected
officials, although they often resist it.”).
286. E.g., OR.TRANSP. & GROWTH MGMT. PROGRAM, MODEL DEVELOPMENT CODE &
USER’S GUIDE FOR SMALL CITIES (2d ed. 2005), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/TGM/docs/
modelCode05/pdf/guide.pdf?ga=t [https://perma.cc/S2AL-7ZC5].
287. E.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer ( July 25, 2017). The attorney described an
episode from his time working for the state:
[W]e got word that a small community on the southern Oregon coast had amended its
comprehensive plan to facilitate the construction of some dwellings . . . down on or very
close to the high-water line on the beach. It was pretty shocking to us where they had agreed
to allow a developer to build . . . . And the way they had done it was totally at odds with the
state process, the state law . . . . So we had to send . . . a letter putting them on notice that
their action was unlawful . . . . We could’ve stopped there . . . [but] I remember making a trip
down to the south coast and walking out onto the beach with their planner and their mayor
and the local state representative and some of my staff . . . . [W]e came to a place where we
said . . . you can put it here . . . and then we helped them through the process of notice and
the public hearing. We explained to them . . . the steps that they needed to go through to
make it happen . . . . I had no question that if we just said no, they would have, you know,
gone away with a very bad taste for their interaction with the state regulatory agency. But we
made the effort not just to say no but then [to] find out what they really wanted to do and
work with them . . . [W]hen our agency budget was up for the next couple of sessions that
mayor made a point of taking his time to drive up to Salem to testify in front of the Ways
and Means Committee in support of our agency budget and the work that we did.
Id.
288. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017). He explained:
[W]hen we did meet outside of Salem . . . we’d invite all the local officials, including the
tribes . . . . And we would invite them to tell us what the issues were. And what are we doing
good and what are we doing bad. What can we do better? And it allowed local people to see
that, oh, these aren’t some pointy-headed bureaucrats in Salem. These are actually normal
people . . . . It benefitted the commissioners too, because they could see, meet the local
people, they could see what the local issues are, they could see stuff on the ground.
Id.
289. E.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017) (“So money was one
component of how to make it work . . . wasn’t enough money, but it did take the sting out of the ask.”).
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of their planning processes, like air quality modeling.290 Similarly, the State of
Oregon hires regional staff who live in and work with (and often come from)
regions of the state; their job is “to deliver the state’s message as diplomatically as
possible and then to bring the message of the counties back to the state agency.”291
As another Oregon attorney explained, “The smaller communities are pretty reliant
on state staff to provide technical assistance.”292
Finally, some interviewees recommended extending flexibility to the choice of
tasks taken on by local governments. On the land use side, both the written literature
and some of my interviewees emphasized the frustrations felt by small, rural local
governments in low-growth areas, who felt that they were being asked to take on
tasks for which they had neither the capacity nor the need.293 In some
circumstances, that reluctance may have sprung from ideological hostility to the
goals of state land use regulation.294 Other objections had non-ideological
justifications: some places just are not growing and do not need sophisticated
plans.295 California’s air quality regulators have found a sensible response to this
problem. In areas where small, local air districts do not have capacity to conduct
their own planning, the state has created consolidated planning areas where larger
air districts can take the lead, or the state simply does much of the work itself.296
Even at some of the larger districts, developing and writing major parts of an air
quality plan may be done by the state.297
This example reflects a broader theme. Of the three programs I studied,
California’s air quality management system has been the most willing to adjust the
boundaries of state and local responsibility (though all have done so to some extent).
Communications between state and local government (and, often, with the EPA)

290. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017).
291. Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
Or. Lawyer (Sept. 12, 2017) (“[O]ne of the things the Department of Land Conservation and
Development learned early on was that they needed to have representatives in different regions of the
state.”).
292. Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Sept. 15, 2017).
293. E.g., Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Sept. 20, 2017) (describing waivers and
flexibility for rural areas that had limited planning capacity and anticipated little growth).
294. See id. (“There were a lot of people that viewed it as communism.”).
295. Of course, an area that isn’t growing now might grow in the future. One Oregon attorney
warned:
You have some cities in eastern, southern, and coastal Oregon where they have plans that
are basically the same as adopted in the 1980s. So there’s a Google that wants to move in,
they have to amend their plan and then they have people that can blackmail them by
threatening to appeal.
Telephone Interview with Or. Attorney (Aug. 14, 2017).
296. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40150 (2014) (authorizing counties to enter into
unified air pollution control districts); id. § 40300 (authorizing entry into regional air districts); id. §
40960 (creating the Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District).
297. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017) ([W]e’ve worked
with CARB very, very closely from the beginning of SIP development . . . . They were often presenters
at our workshops . . . and huge portions of the SIP, especially the technical appendices, would be
written by CARB staff.”).
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routinely occur even where no statute or regulation requires them.298 The air
districts themselves are highly heterogeneous, both in their geographic scale and in
their responsibilities. A large air district like the South Coast Air Quality
Management District, which has hundreds of employees,299 will take on tasks that
its smaller neighbors leave to the state.300 And beyond state-local collaborations, the
districts also work with each other, both through bilateral expertise-sharing
arrangements and through a statewide organization—the California Association of
Air Pollution Control Districts—devoted partly to interagency coordination.301 To
a striking extent, state and local officials seemed happy with these arrangements.302
One local official told me that he had heard EPA and state officials express
frustrations with the smaller air districts,303 and I heard stories of past conflicts,304
but both state and local officials seemed pleased with their present working
relationships.

298. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 21, 2017). The
regulator, who worked for a smaller district, explained the division of labor for an “attainment request,”
which affirms that the district will continue to meet air quality standards for a pollutant:
[W]e’re working with the Air Resources Board on that and it’s very collaborative. We will
draft up elements of this thing. We’ll send it to them to look at. They’ll comment and send
it back. They’re doing calculations—there’s a lot of heavy duty calculations that have to be
done and we’re not real familiar with—they will do that. If modeling were required, they
would do that.
Id. Another regulator, from a much larger district, described a different allocation of responsibilities but
similar integration:
[E]ven if it’s informal it’s highly integrated. We rely on them for some of the emission
inventories for a lot of the categories that they control, including the mobile sources. They
provide all the models. They come up with the mobile source emission inventories. They do
the modeling, the complex air quality modeling that translates emissions into concentrations.
They do the same modeling we do and they use similar platforms and everything is checked
and double-checked and results are compared for consistency.
Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 23, 2017).
299. The district’s internal phone book is fifty-nine pages long. See S. COAST AIR QUALITY
MGMT. DIST., TELEPHONE DIRECTORY (2018), http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/
default-document-library/phone-directory.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/L5P5-DUDE].
300. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 21, 2017).
301. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 23, 2017) (describing several
arrangements); Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 15, 2017) (describing how
his district redirects some state funding to an upwind district with more use for the money). For general
discussion of the importance of such organizations, see Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the
Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008).
302. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 15, 2017) (“[A]s a rural
air district that tends to be pretty isolated . . . it would be easy for us not to get the attention we feel like
we deserve, but I think that we get every bit of attention we ever ask for. It’s been really nice.”).
303. Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Aug. 21, 2017) (“I’ve had a person
from EPA tell me that if it was up to EPA . . . California wouldn’t have thirty-five air districts. They’d
consolidate some of the smaller districts and I can understand why they’re saying that.”).
304. This positive assessment may reflect some selection bias. I was unable to interview at all
of the air districts that work on planning efforts, and EPA staff declined requests for interviews. The
people who did speak with me may have done so partly because they expected to have positive things
to say.
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All of this flexibility has potential pitfalls. In particular, air district staff
repeatedly emphasized the importance, at the outset of any state-local initiative, of
articulating clear goals, defining lines of responsibility, specifying expectations for
decision-making processes, and maintaining lines of communication.305 This sort of
flexible subfederalism also requires robust staffing; it is not governance on the
cheap. But even with those caveats, interviewees clearly viewed a complex,
interwoven, and interactive governance system not as an impediment, but as a key
element of success.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL FEDERALISM DOCTRINES
The primary point of this study is that cooperative subfederalism is a
promising option for state and local governance. That thesis, of course, has its most
obvious implications for interactions between state and local governments, not for
the federal-state relationships addressed by traditional federalism doctrines. But
cooperative federalism does also hold lessons for traditional federalism theory. This
final Part explains two of the most important of these implications.
A. Federalism and a Commitment to Governance
The first implication is straightforward: if cooperative subfederalism is at all
analogous to traditional federalism, then a federal-state governance structure that
treats interactive governance as an important and challenging craft, not a thing to
be limited, holds the best odds of success.
That position departs from some traditional notions of federalism.306 For dual
federalists—a group particularly well represented on the current Supreme Court—
federalism is overtly about division and limitation and implicitly about skepticism
of governance. In both the traditional judicial rhetoric of dual federalism, and in
academic offshoots like the “matching principle,” the working assumption seems
to be that if tasks are divided in a sensible way, with the federal government
abandoning its activist habits and playing a relatively small role, then good outcomes
will emerge.307 We will thrive, in other words, when government is kept in its proper
place, and particularly when the limits constrain the higher levels of the governance
hierarchy.308 And so long as the limits are in place, the mechanics of governance
305. E.g., Telephone Interview with Cal. Air Quality Regulator (Sept. 13, 2017) (recommending
that people “[m]eet regularly” and “[h]ave clear definitions of what each other’s roles are, but also build
into that process opportunities to review each other’s work”).
306. On the other hand, it affirms claims made in the largely non-legal literature on
collaborative governance. See, e.g., JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING
COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(2000).
307. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996). The matching
principle suggests that governance tasks should be assigned to the lowest level of governance whose
jurisdiction encompasses the geographic scope of the problem at hand. Id. at 25. In Butler and Macey’s
account, this would mean reassigning many tasks currently carried out by the federal government. Id.
308. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
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will sort themselves out. Those premises fit with a political culture that is skeptical
of regulation309 and deeply committed to negative conceptions of liberty.310 Not
surprisingly, then, dual federalism has become closely linked with deregulation and
with generalized hostility to governance.311
The state and local officials and private attorneys I spoke with espoused a very
different governance philosophy. As the previous Part has explained in detail,
intergovernmental interaction is a prominent part of that vision, but so too is a
commitment to the idea of governance itself. Even when done with strong
institutional structures, committed leadership, and ample funding, regulating land
use or air quality is challenging work, which is likely to create constant tensions
among governance institutions and between the regulators and the regulated.312
Consequently, the people I spoke with embraced the idea of governance as an
important and meaningful craft, which could be, and needed to be, done well at
every level of the governance system.313 Conversely, they offered no suggestion that
a governance structure premised primarily on division and limitation would ever be
adequate to the tasks at hand. They were not disparaging federalism; a balance of
local, state, and federal authority, in their view, has many virtues.314 Nor were they
ignoring the burdens faced by regulated entities. An important element of good
governance, in their view, is a set of structures and processes for responding to
those concerns.315 But theirs was a federalism of governmental engagement, not
limitation.
That view aligns my interviewees with another school of federalist thought,
which celebrates federalism as a system of redundancy and overlap. To this
“interactive federalism” camp,316 federalism is both an insurance policy and a device
to insure the intergovernmental transfer of ideas.317 It ensures that if one
governance level fails to address a problem, another can step up, and if multiple
levels respond, they can learn from each other’s efforts.318 Broadly speaking, my
309. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2017)
(describing “a judicial agenda hostile to a robust regulatory state”).
310. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“But
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty,
and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”).
311. See Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 282 (2016)
(describing this version of “bad federalism”).
312. No single quote distills this observation; it is an aggregate impression. Instead, I was struck
by how often interviewees spoke of challenges and tensions, and how they never described anything
about governance as simple or easy.
313. E.g., Telephone Interview with Fla. Lawyer ( July 14, 2017) (“I think that it is so important
to have good leadership in setting up a system like this, and committed regional and state actors, and
respected regional and state actors.”); Telephone Interview with Or. Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2017)
(emphasizing the importance of “maturity and seasoning on all sides” to the program’s successes).
314. See supra notes 231–2259 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 239–244 and accompanying text (describing the value regulators placed on
repeated contact with regulated entities).
316. This term, which comes from Schapiro, supra note 91, is just one of many.
317. See supra note 95 (citing multiple sources).
318. See Schapiro, supra note 91, at 289–90.
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study of cooperative subfederalism is consistent with this view, but with a change
in emphasis. Most of the traditional studies favoring interactive federalism focus
primarily on doctrines, like preemption, that allocate authority, not on the systems
governments use to operate within their areas of shared power.319 While the
interactive federalists espouse the value of interaction and dialogue, their accounts
of the day-to-day operations of federalism remain thin.320 Yet, as this study shows,
it is one thing to identify the possibility of productive interaction—or productive
conflict—in a multi-tiered system of governance, and it is another matter to figure
out how to turn that possibility into reality. As scholars and policymakers approach
that latter challenge, cooperative subfederalism provides promising examples for
learning and imitation.
B. Reconsidering the State and a Federalist System
The second important lesson for traditional federalism involves doctrine.
More specifically, a study of cooperative subfederalism exposes the fallacy of the
habit, which recurs throughout federalism case law and theory, of collapsing state
and local governance into a single category.321
In many federalism cases, the Court has identified states with the benefits of
local governance.322 States, in this usual account, possess localized expertise, while
the federal government is the distant and somewhat ignorant outsider.323 While the
conflations of state and local governance may be partly due to sloppiness, they also
serve a rhetorical purpose: they give states a boost in federalism’s classic power
struggles. Consider, for example, United States v. Morrison,324 in which the Court
found that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s authority under
the Commerce Clause. The Court wrote:
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local, and there is no better example of the police power, which
319. There are exceptions to this generalization. See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 91;
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 109–19 (2010) (offering “weak ties networks”
as a strategy for intergovernmental collaboration); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1
(2011) (discussing intergovernmental negotiations within a federalist system).
320. See Owen, supra note 37, at 113–14 (noting this gap).
321. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 1312 (noting this tendency); Gerken, supra note 12, at 21
(same).
322. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991)) (equating “state sovereignty” with “local policies ‘more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society’”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (equating
state and local governance); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (contrasting national and
local governance, without mentioning states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)
(“Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain
responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”).
323. See, e.g., Bond, 564 U.S. at 221 (contrasting state lawmaking with “remote central power”);
McConnell, supra note 80, at 1493 (“[A] national government must take a uniform—and hence less
desirable—approach.”).
324. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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the Founders undeniably left reposed in the States and denied the central
Government, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.325
Or consider National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.326 The Court,
again checking federal authority under the Commerce Clause, claimed that “[t]he
independent power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal
Government,” which helps ensure that powers are “held by governments more local
and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.”327
But cooperative subfederalism holds value precisely because states are not
local and do not automatically subsume the benefits of local governance. They are
often somewhat removed from local conditions.328 They are often less accessible to
both the public and to regulated industries.329 Because of that relative distance, they
are often less able to implement locally-tailored solutions. They often operate in
tension with local government.330 At the same time, states bring advantages to localstate interactions, including a heightened ability to make decisions that transcend
parochial priorities.331 But those advantages accord with the virtues traditional
federalism doctrine assigns to the federal government, not the states.332 The result,
then, is federalism as a messy fractal pattern, which repeats itself—though not with
complete consistency—at multiple scales, not a binary division between the federal
government and everyone else.333
Of course, the fact that the states can be unaware of or indifferent to local
conditions does not mean that they must be. As the discussion in Part III
demonstrates, state and local governments can work together in ways that bring the
benefits of local knowledge up to state levels. But “work” is an important word
here. State governments do not benefit from localized knowledge unless they build
governance structures to assimilate that knowledge and then work hard to
implement them well. When they do not do so, and even sometimes when they do,
state and local governance operate in conflict.334
That reality necessitates a shift in traditional federalism theory, particularly as
it has been espoused by the Supreme Court.335 In many cases, the Court has recited,
325. Id. at 599 (emphasis added); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (“Where Congress
encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”).
326. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
327. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
328. See supra notes 239–244 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 239–244 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 261–264 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
332. See Esty, supra note 23, at 587, 614 (describing traditional arguments for federal
governance).
333. For cautionary notes against viewing federalism as an orderly fractal pattern, see Aaron
Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 442 (2016).
334. See supra notes 261–264 and accompanying text.
335. Academics have been somewhat more attuned to conflicts between state and local
government, but they have not focused on cooperative subfederalism models as responses to those
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without supporting evidence, a series of functional claims about the virtues of state
governance.336 The apparent implication is that the truth of these statements is so
obvious as to make unnecessary any inquiry into their accuracy, or, perhaps, that
their faithful repetition alone will render them true. The asserted sensitivity of states
to local conditions is just one of these cherished myths of traditional federalism.337
And like the best mythology, this particular myth grows from kernels of truth: if
states invest effort in doing so, they can indeed create governance structures and
policies that validate the classic assumptions of federalism theory. But if a state does
not invest that effort, the claims of state sensitivity to local needs may be nothing
more than empty falsehoods. Consequently, if the Court is going to accord weight
to these claims,338 it should ask whether a state is doing the hard work necessary to
integrate the benefits of localism into state policy and law. The existence of a
cooperative subfederalism program would be powerful evidence of that
commitment.
CONCLUSION
The tension between parochialism and central engagement creates some of
the defining challenges of our political era. And while academics and judges in the
United States are accustomed to viewing that challenge through the lens of federalstate relationships, it can emerge with similar force in the relationships of local
governments and states. Almost every vice or virtue that traditional federalism
theory ascribes to the federal government can be similarly ascribed to the states, and
almost every virtue or vice that states claim can also be claimed by local
governments. That raises questions about whether cooperative federalism, which
theorists have suggested as a compromise designed to harness the benefits of
multitier governance, can be extended to relationships between states and locals.
This Article concludes that it can. Cooperative subfederalism systems exist,
and while some, like California’s new groundwater regulatory system, are brand new,
participants in some older programs view them as successful governance systems.
They make no claims that governance within a cooperative subfederalism system is
easy, and the struggles of the existing programs—and Florida’s late system—would
belie any such assertion. Indeed, the tensions and challenges of cooperative
subfederalist systems only underscore the extent to which traditional federalism
theory has glossed over the differences between state and local governance. But
with strong commitments to collaboration and to state support of local governance,
a cooperative subfederalism system can thrive.
conflicts. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that
state-centered federalism limits local innovation); Davidson, supra note 138.
336. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222–23 (2011); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
337. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
338. Whether the Court actually does accord much weight to these claims, or whether they just
provide rhetorical backfill for decisions reached on other grounds, is difficult to discern. But the lines
are repeated often enough to support an inference that they do matter.

First to Printer_Owen (Do Not Delete)

228

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

[ Vol. 9:177

